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Abstract 
This paper examines the topic of net neutrality in a range of countries, with focus on Norway, 
the US and the EU region. It begins by examining the political settings of each country and 
by discussing different levels of net neutrality legislation that could be enacted. In the US 
there is a history of litigious behaviour and anticompetitive practices, and as a result the FCC 
has reclassified broadband under the telecommunications classification, known as Title II. 
This reclassification was enacted in order to give greater control to the regulator and be able 
to enforce stricter net neutrality laws, which expressly forbids blocking, throttling and paid 
prioritization.  
 
Europe is also strongly pro net neutrality but has a more diverse range of views, owing to the 
heterogeneity in the European area. Some countries support strict net neutrality, such as the 
Netherlands, but others, such as Germany, question the financial feasibility of the legislation. 
Europe also has anticompetitive practices occurring, with evidence suggesting blocking and 
throttling is occurring across the region. 
 
Norway has the oldest net neutrality doctrine currently in place, and has a strong history of 
compliance and cooperation between firms and government, and has found success with 
other regulations of the broadband industry that have failed elsewhere. This is partially due to 
the coregulatory approach Norway’s policy makers use, specifically consulting and taking 
input from all relevant parties, and also due to the compliance of large companies with the 
regulatory bodies, which is a stark contrast from the US companies. As would be expected 
based on this, there is no evidence of the anticompetitive practices examined in this thesis 
occurring in Norway. 
 
There are also differences in the existing regulation affecting the broadband market in each 
region.  Norway has compulsory unbundling regulation in place, which is forcing any 
monopolistic network to rent out a portion of its capacity at a competitive price to other 
providers. This increases competition in the broadband market by subsidising entry and 
removing the competitive advantage that monopolists have. This policy was originally 
implemented in the US but was found to be ineffective there. In contrast, Norway and the UK 
both found it to be effective and plan to continue enforcing it with future networks. Some 
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areas of the EU implement this policy, while others do not, adding to the heterogeneity of the 
European markets.  
 
This thesis aims to address three non-neutral strategies discussed in the literature. Firstly, 
blocking, which is excluding content from the market. Secondly, throttling, which is 
deliberately degrading the speed and quality of the internet connection for specific content. 
The third and final strategy is paid prioritization, which is allowing for different tiers of 
speeds for different prices between the Internet Service Provider (ISP) and Content Providers 
(CPs).  In the current thesis I am using the model from the paper ‘The economics of net 
neutrality’ by Economides and Hermalin (2012) in order to examine the issues of blocking, 
throttling and paid prioritization. The model entails a continuum of CPs and households (HH) 
connected by a single ISP.  
 
The results show that blocking and throttling unambiguously reduce welfare. Paid 
prioritization is examined from a welfare perspective, both statically and dynamically under a 
range of market conditions. Based on this exploration, it is concluded that paid prioritization 
is welfare maximising in the case of perfect price discrimination by the ISP, while net 
neutrality is welfare maximising in the case of imperfect price discrimination. Furthermore, 
ISP investment is reduced by net neutrality, and with perfect price discrimination the welfare 
effects of net neutrality are ambiguous. The ambiguous final result allows for the possibility 
of different optimal regulations in each region.  
 
There are several assumptions that are embedded into the model, which temper the strength 
and realism of the conclusions I have drawn. These assumptions include using a 
multiplicatively separable preference function, the use of a single ISP, the degree of price 
differentiation used, and the cost curve selected for the ISP’s investment in the dynamic 
setting. The welfare optimal policy for each country depends crucially on the profits of the 
ISP compared to the consumer surplus of the HH, and thus depends on the level of 
competitiveness in the market.  This paper then compares each country and concludes that, 
holding the previous relationship constant across countries, net neutrality laws are more 
likely to be welfare optimal in the US, while Norway is less likely to have a welfare optimal 
net neutrality regime.  
	  	   VII	  
Foreword 
 
I would like to offer my thanks and appreciation to those who have been integral to both the 
process of completing this thesis, and in offering me support and advice.  
 
Tore Nilssen has supervised this thesis, and he has been an outstanding supervisor. He has 
offered invaluable input and support, and has been extremely helpful with conceptual, 
mathematical and structural questions. So special thanks to you, Tore. 
 
Telenor supported this thesis by awarding me with a stipend. I would like to formally thank 
them for their financial support.  
 
I would also like to thank my classmates for their help with this thesis. Firstly, Tyra who both 
read drafts and discussed many concepts with me, as well as aiding in discussing the structure 
of this thesis. I would also like to thank Vetle, who was kind enough to read my thesis and 
offer his input and opinions. I would also like to thank Joseph for giving feedback and paying 
special attention to the mathematical elements. 
 
I would also like to thank Selma for reading every single drafted version of this thesis that I 
have written, while also being supportive and allowing me to use you as a sounding board for 
ideas and to complain to when I inevitably had difficulties.  
 
Finally I want to thank my parents for supporting me both financially and emotionally 
throughout my studies. The opportunity to travel here to complete this Master’s degree was a 
rare one, and wouldn’t have been possible without my brilliant parents. 
 
 
 
 
	  VIII	  
  
	  	   IX	  
Table of contents 
1	   Introduction	  ..............................................................................................................................	  1	  
1.1	   Overview	  ...........................................................................................................................................	  1	  
1.2	   Degrees	  of	  net	  neutrality	  .............................................................................................................	  3	  
1.3	   Political	  situation	  ...........................................................................................................................	  4	  1.3.1	   USA	  .................................................................................................................................................................	  4	  1.3.2	   Europe	  ..........................................................................................................................................................	  6	  1.3.3	   Norway	  .........................................................................................................................................................	  7	  
1.4	   Regulatory	  measures	  .................................................................................................................	  10	  1.4.1	   Compulsory	  unbundling	  .....................................................................................................................	  10	  1.4.2	   Regulatory	  oversight	  ............................................................................................................................	  12	  1.4.3	   Regulation’s	  effect	  on	  competitiveness	  ........................................................................................	  12	  
1.5	   Focus	  questions	  ...........................................................................................................................	  12	  1.5.1	   Motivation	  for	  research	  questions	  .................................................................................................	  12	  1.5.2	   Model	  selection	  .......................................................................................................................................	  13	  
2	   Model	  .........................................................................................................................................	  14	  
2.1	   The	  Structure	  of	  the	  game	  ........................................................................................................	  14	  
2.2	   Welfare	  analysis	  ..........................................................................................................................	  18	  2.2.1	   Relationship	  between	  content	  traded	  and	  welfare	  .................................................................	  18	  2.2.2	   Blocking’s	  effect	  on	  welfare	  ..............................................................................................................	  20	  2.2.3	   The	  welfare	  effects	  of	  prioritization	  ..............................................................................................	  21	  2.2.4	   Internet	  service	  provider’s	  pricing	  decisions	  and	  welfare	  effects	  ...................................	  24	  2.2.5	   Dynamic	  effects	  on	  welfare	  ...............................................................................................................	  30	  
3	   Discussion	  ................................................................................................................................	  34	  
3.1	   Implications	  and	  summary	  of	  results	  ..................................................................................	  34	  3.1.1	   Results	  ........................................................................................................................................................	  34	  3.1.2	   Realism	  of	  the	  model’s	  assumptions	  .............................................................................................	  38	  3.1.3	   How	  the	  results	  compare	  with	  other	  models	  ............................................................................	  41	  3.1.4	   Future	  possible	  extensions	  ................................................................................................................	  42	  
3.2	   Regulatory	  decisions	  and	  their	  effects	  ................................................................................	  44	  3.2.1	   Prevalence	  of	  throttling	  and	  blocking	  ...........................................................................................	  44	  3.2.2	   Investment	  and	  net	  neutrality	  regulation	  ...................................................................................	  44	  3.2.3	   Compulsory	  unbundling	  regulation	  ...............................................................................................	  45	  
3.3	   Potential	  differences	  in	  optimal	  policy	  between	  countries	  .........................................	  46	  3.3.1	   Europe	  ........................................................................................................................................................	  46	  3.3.2	   U.S.A	  .............................................................................................................................................................	  47	  3.3.3	   Norway	  .......................................................................................................................................................	  47	  3.3.4	   Optimal	  policy	  comparisons	  .............................................................................................................	  48	  
4	   Conclusion	  ...............................................................................................................................	  50	  
References	  ......................................................................................................................................	  51	  
Appendix	  .........................................................................................................................................	  56	  
Explicit	  calculations	  with	  separable	  preference	  function	  .......................................................	  56	  
Deriving	  the	  profit	  function	  of	  the	  ISP	  ............................................................................................	  58	  
 
 
 
	  X	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   1	  
1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Net neutrality is a topical economic and political issue, and is about determining the effects 
of different regulatory approaches to the relationships between Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs; e.g. Comcast in the US, Telenor, Canal Digital in Norway), Content Providers (CPs; 
e.g. Google, Netflix, YouTube) and End Users or Households (HH). Although there is no 
global definition of net neutrality, it generally refers to keeping all internet speed equal rather 
than having preferential speeds or ‘fast lanes’ for larger companies, which are feared to lead 
to anti competitive practices. The name comes from the idea of keeping an internet that is 
neutral or fair for all parties, with data packets queued fairly and consumers having the same 
access to all content placed on the internet. The Oxford dictionary defines net neutrality as 
“The principle that Internet service providers should enable access to all content and 
applications regardless of the source, and without favouring or blocking particular products 
or websites” (Oxford Dictionary, 2015). The EU defined it in Amendment 237 recently as: 
“’net neutrality’ means the principle that all internet traffic is treated equally, without 
discrimination, restriction or interference, independent of its sender, receiver, type, content, 
device, service or application” (European Commission, 2014a). 
 
Net neutrality is an important issue because of the increasingly important role the internet 
plays not only in commerce and the global economy, but also in the consumption of goods 
and services by individuals on a daily basis. Internet accessibility has grown steadily around 
the globe and there are still areas with potential for high growth in Africa and Asia, where 
relatively low proportions of the population have access to the internet at 16% and 32% 
respectively, compared with Europe's estimate of 75% (International Telecommunications 
Union, 2014). Data consumption is also predicted to continue with exponential growth as 
more services are substituted from newspapers and television to internet services, as the 
internet supplants traditional media (European Commission, 2014b). The internet is 
becoming more and more integrated into people’s everyday lives, with 65% of Europeans 
using the internet daily in 2014, a significant increase from 31% in 2006 (European 
Commission, 2014b). Data storage is also being shifted online with both large companies and 
consumers transferring from secure in-house servers to secure cloud-based technology, with 
more than one fifth of individuals in Europe using cloud based storage systems (European 
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Commission, 2014b). The European Commission for Digital Agenda predict that overall IP 
traffic will quadruple by 2016 (European Commission, 2015). They also state that congestion 
is exacerbated by insufficient broadband coverage in Europe, stating that only half of the 
investment required for complete coverage by 2020 has been reached (European 
Commission, 2015). Norway compares well with the world and European averages, with 
88% of households having access to broadband and 22% having access to fibre optics 
(Statistics Norway, 2014). 
  
These growth trends emphasise the importance of finding a clear consensus on net neutrality. 
Advocates for removing net neutrality argue that the necessary income streams of ISPs 
required for the next generation of internet infrastructure can only be realised with the ability 
to charge CPs (Buckley, 2014; Krämer, Wiewiorra, & Weinhardt, 2013; Kushnick, 2014). On 
the other hand, its defenders raise issues with anticompetitive practices and entry deterrence, 
as well as pointing to investments in content as a possible casualty of its removal (Gans, 
2014; Krämer et al., 2013; Lee & Wu, 2009; Wang, Ma, & Chiu, 2014). This issue is 
pressing because of the implications it has for investment decisions of ISPs in the future. 
Internet infrastructure is costly and since 1996 more than $1.3 trillion USD has been invested 
in broadband by the US industry alone (USTelecom, 2015a). The next generation network 
will involve direct fibre optic lines into each household. Fibre optic lines allow broadband 
speeds of up to 1GB per second, which is substantially faster than alternatives. Fibre is also a 
resilient network as it has the capacity to support broadband speeds of over 1000 times 
current levels (Broadbandnow, 2015).  
 
The main drawbacks of fibre optic networks are that they are prohibitively expensive. 
Telenor announced in 2013 an estimated four billion Norwegian kroner investment per year 
across all of their networks, with the majority of this being put towards the next-generation 
high-speed internet lines of fibre optics (Telenor, 2015). Verizon has halted expansion of its 
FiOS (Fibre Optic Services) network, which is fibre optics directly into the household. They 
reasoned that the investments required per household were making it financially unviable, 
stating that they had already invested $24 billion in the expansion since 2004 (Buckley, 
2014). They further stated that they would need to break even on the initial investment before 
further expansion could be considered (Buckley, 2014). According to reports, Goldman and 
Sachs estimate that it would cost $140 billion in order to reach every household in the US 
with fibre (Yarow, 2012). Given the substantial sums and commitment these investments 
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require, it is imperative that a clear, decisive, and consistent decision is reached quickly, in 
order to prevent uncertainty from stifling growth. It is equally important that the decision 
reached is the correct one in terms of maximising the welfare of society, which regulators 
exist to protect.  
 
1.2 Degrees of net neutrality 
Net neutrality is often discussed in binary terms, and political figures and companies are 
usually framed as being either pro or anti net neutrality. However, it would be more accurate 
to view it as a continuum of possible policies, with the most pure neutrality at one end and no 
regulation or oversight at the other extreme. One technique that can be used by ISPs that 
affects CPs and consumers is throttling, which is the deliberate degradation of traffic quality 
by use of inefficient information paths. It is feared that throttling can be used to either extract 
rent from content providers for reaching clients, or to promote a singular product that has 
paid for the privilege (European Commission, 2015).  
 
A similar concept is blocking, which refers to actively blocking certain content from reaching 
customers via their network in order to provide exclusivity for a preferred partners product, 
or extract a ‘toll booth’ rent from content providers (European Commission, 2014a, 2015). It 
is important to note that ISPs such as Comcast, AT&T, and Verizon are all against these 
practices, and these activities would fall under competition law in many countries (AT&T, 
2012; Comcast, 2014; Verizon, 2014). However, as will be discussed below, there seems to 
be some evidence that Comcast has used throttling as a leverage tactic in bargaining with 
Netflix (Ehrenfreund, 2014).  
 
The next degree of neutrality that has been more central to debate is that of paid 
prioritisation, which is allowing ISP services to offer higher speed or prioritised traffic at a 
higher price1. Some argue that this would allow for higher levels of investment and a faster, 
higher quality internet for all, while allowing content providers that rely on streaming or 
other bandwidth intensive products to offer a more stable and consistent service to consumers 
(Devins, 2014 ). Others believe that creating fast lanes for some content must necessarily 
degrade quality for the slow lane products (Gustin, 2014).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Paid prioritization is also referred to as tiering. In this thesis I also will sometimes refer to a policy involving 
paid prioritization as a non-neutral regime for convenience. 
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It is also possible to prioritise data not based on higher payments or its sender, receiver, or the 
content it holds, but only based on its type. This is known as data discrimination and is 
considered to be less of a violation of net neutrality than paid prioritisation, as many view it 
as necessary and efficient network management. Wu (2003) argues that a full neutrality 
doctrine does not actually treat all content fairly, as it implicitly favours data that requires 
lower quality connections to consume effectively. As an example, voiceIP and streaming 
have stricter requirements on quality of broadband and real time delivery, in order to be 
feasible, compared with other services. Wu (2003) proposes that ISPs should be able to make 
reasonable decisions in promoting some data in order to lead to a higher quality product 
overall for consumers . Much of the debate on this issue in the political spectrum is focusing 
on how much discretion ISPs should be afforded and what constitutes reasonable traffic 
management (European Commission, 2014a). 
 
Full net neutrality thus entails that all data packets are treated equally, regardless of data type, 
and this is the strongest of the possible net neutrality regulations. All of the above practices 
would be illegal under this regime.  Opponents to this complete regulation argue that it 
restricts the ability of ISPs to efficiently manage the network and that it leads to inefficient 
outcomes (Comcast, 2014; Telenor, 2014).   
 
1.3 Political situation 
1.3.1 USA 
In the US, the FCC (Federal Communications Commission) is the regulator of 
telecommunications, including broadband internet. The level of regulation has been legally 
contested and the newest laws in place will likely be challenged in the courts to determine the 
enforceability of any such act (Mashables, 2015). Prior to 2010 there had been no explicit 
regulation in place although the market had operated in a de facto neutral state. To ensure the 
continuation of this, the FCC released the Open Internet Order, which contained four main 
principles; transparency, no blocking, no unreasonable discrimination and reasonable 
discretion for network management. However, in early 2014, the US Court of Appeal for the 
District of Columbia struck down the discrimination and blocking rules while upholding the 
transparency rules (USTelecom, 2015b). Possibly as a result of this ruling, in March 2014 the 
FCC proposed a more expansive regulation, seeking to reclassify broadband under the 
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common carrier rules originally intended for the landline sector, known as Title II (FCC, 
2015). The FCC opened up for public opinion on this issue and received over four million 
responses, most of which expressed either favour for net neutrality or concern at the 
possibility of erosion of net neutrality (FCC, 2015).  
 
President Obama recently came out in support of net neutrality stating that “An open Internet 
is essential to the American economy, and increasingly to our very way of life” (Obama, 
2014). He also raised concerns about some of the potential negative effects failing to enshrine 
net neutrality would have on competitive entry, censorship, investment and innovation in 
technology (Obama, 2014). He called on the FCC to implement the strongest possible rules in 
order to preserve competition, and expressed concern at allowing ISP services to warp 
competition and prevent entry in the CP market. He then concluded by emphasising the 
FCC’s mandate to promote competition, innovation and investment and stressed the 
importance of net neutrality to this (Obama, 2014).  
 
Comcast and other ISPs have applauded pro neutrality stances taken in the US, however they 
argue that this does not require the reclassification of broadband services under Title II 
(Comcast, 2014; Verizon, 2014). Comcast’s EVP David Cohen stated that Comcast is 
strongly in support of FCC placing legally enforceable rules in place to protect an open 
internet, even mentioning the need for transparency and reiterating their stance against 
blocking and discrimination. However, he continued on to say that they do not support a 
reclassification to a telecommunications service and cited innovation and investment as two 
victims of this potential move (Comcast, 2015). The Title II reclassification would allow a 
much larger amount of regulatory control for the FCC, even theoretically allowing them to 
set price caps, although the FCC has claimed that many of the additional abilities will be 
disregarded in the new legislation (Comcast, 2014; FCC, 2015; Wheeler, 2015).  
 
On February 5th 2015 the FCC announced its proposal for reclassifying broadband under 
Title II, which reinstated the bans on blocking, throttling and paid prioritisation, while also 
giving themselves authority to address complaints about ISP practices (FCC, 2015). The FCC 
also stated that there would be no rate regulation, no last-mile compulsory unbundling and no 
additional administrative requirements that other industries face under Title II (FCC, 2015). 
They also believe they will be able to foster sufficient investment, citing as an example the 
wireless industry, which has been under Title II and has healthy levels of investment (FCC, 
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2015; Wheeler, 2015). On February 26th 2015, the FCC passed these regulations into law, 
formally reclassifying broadband under Title II. FCC chairman Tom Wheeler underlined the 
significance of the new regulations, stating that “The Internet is simply too important to allow 
broadband providers to be the ones making the rules”, while opponents indicated that this 
ruling would definitely be challenged in the legal system (Mashables, 2015). 
 
Net neutrality graduated from a theoretical fear to a practical issue when some ISPs were 
reported to be intentionally throttling during a negotiation period with select CPs. The 
Washington Post reported that Comcast was throttling Netflix data, which significantly 
lowered the quality of their product, in order to extract extra rent from them (Ehrenfreund, 
2014). This was the type of rent extraction advocates for net neutrality have feared, as it can 
allow for entry deterrence for a premium by degrading competitors’ quality, or by just raising 
the capital required to enter the market. There is also evidence that throttling and blocking 
occur in Europe, as the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications 
(BEREC) discovered in a fact-finding mission released in May 2012 (BEREC, 2012). Netflix 
and other CPs have unsurprisingly come out heavily in favour of strong net neutrality, with 
Netflix CEO Hastings stating clearly that it is the ISP’s responsibility to pay for the network 
(Hastings, 2014). Both the CP industry and the ISP industry have vested interests in the 
outcome of this debate. CPs would enjoy higher profits if the concept of net neutrality were 
enshrined, as it protects them from exposure to rent seeking behaviour from ISPs. In contrast, 
ISPs would prefer more relaxed net laws, as stricter versions will restrict their ability to 
adequately charge CPs for the network they build and provide. 
  
1.3.2 Europe 
The political landscape in Europe is much larger and more heterogeneous in comparison with 
the US. Overall, the EU has taken a very pro net neutrality stance, with the EU commission 
passing a bill on net neutrality regulation via many amendments that passed their first vote in 
April 2014. The European Commission responsible for the Digital Agenda does acknowledge 
the need for some data discrimination. They specifically note that certain services and 
applications require some degree of prioritisation to offer a reasonable product and 
experience to consumers (European Commission, 2014a). Not all areas of Europe share the 
same views, however. One of the most pro neutrality countries is the Netherlands, which was 
the first European country to enshrine net neutrality into law in 2012 (Berners-Lee, 2015). 
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More recently, Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, made statements in contrast to the EU 
position stating that while an innovation friendly internet is important, the development of 
this relies on the network offering reasonable and predictable quality of service (Devins, 
2014). The real question of how strong the net neutrality legislation is going to be, and how 
heavily it will be enforced, will only become clear in practice over time.  
 
1.3.3 Norway 
Norway has the oldest net neutrality policy in Europe currently in place (Sørensen, 2014b). 
The issue has not received the same level of airtime as in the EU parliament, or within the US 
and, as a result, is not as hotly debated. That may be attributed to Norway being relatively 
unique as one of the only countries to adopt a coregulatory approach, where the government 
acts as a mediator rather than a warden of the market place. This method facilitates 
discussion and compromise between all interested parties. Norway, along with the rest of 
Scandinavia, have a high degree of cooperation from ISPs and CPs. Norway’s ISPs have a 
history of being extremely compliant and this contrasts with the litigious nature of the 
relationship between regulator and ISPs in the US (Kushnick, 2014; Mashables, 2015). In 
Norway, the regulator is The Post and Telecommunications Authority (NKOM), which has 
taken a pro net neutrality position (Sørensen, 2014a, 2014b). NKOM dismissed concerns 
about the profitability of ISPs, noting that it is the ISPs themselves that choose a flat pricing 
model for consumer internet access (Sørensen, 2014a). NKOM defended their position by 
stating that it is online content that drives the demand for ISPs products, and that the demand 
for higher bandwidth intensive content is beneficial for both parties (Sørensen, 2014a, 
2014b). They also stressed that the network effects of increasing the number of users increase 
the value of the content or applications they use (Sørensen, 2014a).  
 
However, while being pro neutrality and against paid prioritization, NKOM is not against 
data discrimination, noting that the most important goal of net neutrality regulation is to 
preserve an open internet and prevent discrimination and fragmentation2. They also state that 
this requires some degree of reasonable network management (Sørensen, 2014a, 2014b). 
NKOM opted for a coregulatory approach, in which all affected parties are involved in the 
decision making process and guidelines are put in place that are followed in good faith. This 
is only possible due to the compliance of stakeholders in Norway, and removes the need for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Fragmentation in this context refers to concerns that rampant blocking and other anticompetitive practices 
could lead to several smaller ‘internets’ rather than the single unified internet that currently exists. 
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laws to be put in place or for the courts to make rulings, such as in the US.   
 
In 2009, NKOM coordinated an agreement intended to enshrine net neutrality by brokering 
an internet services agreement with Norway’s relevant major ISPs, the Consumer Council of 
Norway (CCN; Forbrukerrådet) and some representatives from the IT community (Sørensen, 
2014b). The agreement was based on three principles. Firstly, that end users be given 
complete and accurate information on the quality and capacity of the internet they are 
purchasing. Secondly, that users should be allowed to send and receive any content with no 
restrictions, and be free to choose any services or applications, provided they do not hurt the 
network. Thirdly, that connections cannot be discriminated against on the basis of content, 
receiver, sender, or application choice (Forbrukerrådet, 2011). The overarching theme to the 
agreement in the words of Thomas Nordvedt, Head of Section Digital Services at the 
Consumer Council of Norway (CCN; Forbrukerrådet), was that “It must be up to individual 
broadband customers to decide how to use their bandwidth” (Forbrukerrådet, 2011). NKOM 
made it clear that it was expected that even companies that did not endorse the guidelines 
must still adhere to them (Sørensen, 2014b). However, Telenor, one of the largest ISPs in 
Norway, withdrew from the agreement in 2011(Forbrukerrådet, 2011). Telenor stated that 
they now believed that internet and mobile users should pay for data travelling through their 
network, and pointed to substantial increases in traffic over recent years. They further 
claimed that the current business model was financially unsustainable, and announced plans 
to charge YouTube and NRK for content streaming (Forbrukerrådet, 2011). CCN condemned 
this decision, describing it as disappointing and “a step in the wrong direction” 
(Forbrukerrådet, 2011).   
 
NKOM holds annual meetings in order to discuss issues facing the industry. These meetings 
are attended by concerned parties and stakeholders. In late 2013, one such meeting was held 
that focused on the European Commission’s recent net neutrality initiative3 (Thorkildsen, 
2014). During this meeting, Telenor stated that while some elements of the initiative were 
good, restricting the ISPs ability to prioritise traffic and manage the network would 
ultimately harm the consumers. They also expressed concern that further regulations from the 
EU government would be too restrictive on both the industry and their customers (Telenor, 
2014). They concluded that they were happy with the current net neutrality guidelines in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The meeting occurred on the 10th of October 2013 and participants included NKOM, CCN, NRK, TV2, Cable 
Norway and other stakeholders. 
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Norway. In March 2014, Telenor’s division director Harald Krogh criticised the efforts of the 
EU parliament, saying that what started as an effort to maintain a free and open internet had 
turned into a mechanism that could stifle innovation and degrade the quality of the internet 
for everyone (Telenor, 2014). He stressed that every ISP has strong incentives to keep the 
internet free and open, as internet access is their core product and they have no incentives to 
degrade the quality of service (Telenor, 2014). He referenced the large continuous investment 
Telenor makes in its infrastructure and noted that the only content they censor is illegal 
material such as child pornography, copyright violations, or intellectual property rights 
violations4. He then went on to criticise the vagueness and room left for interpretation in the 
current EU regulation and sighted inefficiencies in some of the possible interpretations of the 
rules (Telenor, 2014). 
 
In March 2014, it was reported by Dagbladet that Telenor and Netflix had reached a private 
agreement to host Netflix servers on Telenor’s networks for an undisclosed amount, weeks 
after Netflix made an agreement with Comcast (Thorkildsen, 2014). CCN’s comment in the 
article described it as troubling, whereas Telenor responded that no net neutrality principles 
were being violated. Telenor stated that this deal involved caching, which is storing data on 
the Telenor network, which they described as part of expanding the network’s capacity 
(Thorkildsen, 2014). NKOM stated that they considered the use of caching acceptable as long 
as it was not to the detriment of other traffic, however, caching methods or systems would 
not automatically be considered net neutral and would be considered individually 
(Thorkildsen, 2014). Concerns were also raised about the conflict of interests that can arise 
for ISPs. The fear was that when they have a competing product in the market, they would 
have incentives to influence the quality of competitors’ products via their network 
management. More specifically, concerns were raised in the media regarding Telenor’s 
control over Spotify’s traffic, as they were directly competing with their own product WIMP 
(Forbrukerrådet, 2011).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Both intellectual property and copyright infringements are dealt with in the legal system and ISPs simply 
follow directives from the courts.  
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1.4 Regulatory measures 
1.4.1 Compulsory unbundling  
Compulsory unbundling5 is one of many regulatory measures available to create competition 
in sectors that have natural barriers to entry. Compulsory unbundling refers to forcing a 
monopolistic network operator to rent out a portion of their network to competitors at a price 
set by the regulator, in order to create a sufficient level of competition (Wallsten & 
Hausladen, 2009). It is generally accepted by both sides of the debate that reasonable levels 
of competition in the industry mitigate net neutrality concerns to some degree (Wallsten & 
Hausladen, 2009). Compulsory unbundling is a mechanism to maintain sufficient competition 
in markets where building parallel systems and infrastructures are prohibitively expensive 
and inefficient, broadband is a network that falls under this umbrella. This facilitates entrance 
to the retail market, as a regulated price must necessarily be less than the price offered to 
consumers, and allows potential entrants to enter the market. Entrants capture a share of the 
market by offering a price above the regulated price but below the current market prices. In 
this way competition is increased, monopolistic power is weakened and consumer surplus is 
increased (Wallsten & Hausladen, 2009). Compulsory unbundling has occurred previously in 
the US, Europe, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea in the telecommunications markets for 
phone lines and broadband (Crandall, Eisenach, & Ingraham, 2013). 
 
In the US, local or large scale monopolies of phone and power lines (and more recently 
broadband connection) are commonplace. Rather than using compulsory unbundling to 
artificially increase the level of competition in a market, the preferred current method of 
protecting consumers is with a large degree of regulatory oversight (Crandall et al., 2013; 
Wallsten & Hausladen, 2009). Compulsory unbundling originated in the US in 1996. The 
prevailing theory motivating this was that it would lead to higher competition in the short 
term, and once market shares were established, entrants would invest in their own 
infrastructure and expand the size of the networks (Wallsten & Hausladen, 2009). However, 
what was observed was that the low regulated price disincentivised firms to invest, and firms 
instead chose to continue to use the low cost network of the incumbent (Wallsten & 
Hausladen, 2009). In more recent times, the US tends to emphasise competition between 
networks rather than within networks, and no longer requires new telecom networks to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Compulsory unbundling is also referred to as mandatory unbundling generally, or when specifically talking 
about broadband often referred to as Local Loop Unbundling or LLU. 
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unbundle (Wallsten & Hausladen, 2009). 
 
Aggregate data across countries has typically shown a negative effect of unbundling on 
investment. This finding is intuitive as unbundling weakens investment incentives because 
the benefit of building a next generation network is lessened (Wallsten & Hausladen, 2009). 
Wallsten and Hausladen (2009) contend that compulsory unbundling may not necessarily 
change incumbent network operators’ incentives to prioritise or affect traffic. Unbundling in 
the UK has shown different results; Nardotto, Valletti, and Verboven (2014) found that 
unbundling significantly increased entrance into the market and increased overall broadband 
penetration. The increased broadband penetration suggests that the effect on investment 
incentives was outweighed by the effect of increased competition. Nardotto et al. (2014) 
observed significantly faster download speeds and concluded that unbundling leads to higher 
quality of service to consumers. This contrasts Wallsten and Hausladen’s (2009) conclusion, 
which is that countries that rely on unbundled networks see less investment in next 
generation networks. They contend that as a result, higher competition between networks is 
more effective than higher competition within networks at increasing investment. 
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the effect on fibre deployment and investment 
could well exceed the effect on the last generation of networks, due to the timing of the 
regulation (Crandall et al., 2013). Copper networks had already been built, and the 
investments sunk, before unbundling was announced originally. Crandall et al. (2013) 
suggests that unbundling would likely deter the deployment of the fibre network entirely, and 
thus harm consumer welfare.  
 
Norway has previously turned to compulsory unbundling to regulate DSL (Digital Subscriber 
Line) networks. In 2000, Telenor was the incumbent operator of the older generation ADSL 
(Asymmetric DSL) network, which the new entrant NGT devalued by expanding a newer 
DSL network. Norway’s previous unbundling regulations have been accepted with no 
resistance from large ISPs (Telenor, 2013). NKOM determined that the price set was too high 
and in response Telenor, the ISP owning majority of the copper lines, offered to reduce the 
rental price a further 15%. It was reported in 2014 by ZDnet, a technology publication, that 
NKOM has determined that Telenor’s fibre wholesale network will now be required to allow 
LLU (Øyvann,	  2014).  
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1.4.2 Regulatory oversight 
Regulatory oversight is a more straightforward measure available to regulators. Typically,  
this entails enshrining net neutrality into law and explicitly defining acceptable and 
unacceptable business practices. This also requires a regulatory watchdog that monitors 
market participants to prevent indiscretions and to enforce punishments, litigation or 
resolutions in the case of violations. This is the enforcement measure currently being used 
and considered in Europe and the US. The degree of oversight should be related to the level 
of compliance from market participants and the prevalence of anticompetitive practices.  
 
1.4.3 Regulation’s effect on competitiveness 
Industries that involve public goods, such as broadband, have always been regulated to some 
degree. It is difficult to tease apart the effects of this base level of regulation from the 
intrinsic elements of the market. Is broadband a naturally monopolistic market, or has the 
existing regulation and municipal governance of the industry dissuaded entry and led to this 
result? Kotrous (2015) argues that the market for broadband is overly regulated at the local 
ISP level, and that this reduces entry and competition, and facilitates higher levels of market 
power. He argues that this market power is the very symptom net neutrality advocates are 
trying to restrict with net neutrality laws, but states that a better solution would be to remove 
the existing municipal regulations which act as an entry deterrence. Kotrous (2015) then 
concludes that less regulation, in the form of removing barriers to entry, is a less convoluted 
and more logical solution to the issue, rather than applying additional regulation in the form 
of net neutrality laws. This however, does not address some underlying issues that occur in 
network economics and in strategic competition settings. Given the fixed costs and marginal 
costs implied from building and forming a network, it is clearly possible to have a socially 
inefficient amount of entry, both in terms of too much or too little (Tirole, 1988). There are 
also network effects occurring in this setting as more competition via easier initial entry also 
lowers investment incentives, so the validity and realism of deregulation improving social 
welfare remain unclear. 
 
1.5 Focus questions 
1.5.1 Motivation for research questions 
Net neutrality is a broad and diverse topic of interest and as such there is a wide range of 
models and focus questions in the literature. The focus of this thesis will be on the welfare of 
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society under different regimes, and I will examine a range of issues.  
 
One of the areas of interest for this thesis is blocking. Blocking is worth investigating, as it is 
an action that is publicly dismissed by all parties, but there is evidence to suggest that it has 
occurred across multiple countries. Therefore, a focus will be to investigate the welfare 
effects of blocking to determine whether it is an issue that warrants legislative focus, and 
whether its effect is positive, negative or ambiguous. Similarly, throttling has been shown to 
occur both in the US and in Europe so its welfare effects are important to examine.  
 
However, as the introduction shows, paid prioritization is the most ambiguous issue currently 
facing policy makers, and its welfare effects in previous literature have been the most diverse 
and unclear. Therefore, this issue warrants clear attention and will be a large focus of the 
following analysis. While there is a large body of work surrounding static welfare with a 
fixed supply of bandwidth, an area warranting more focus is the dynamic effects on 
infrastructure investment of ISP's. Thus, an important research questions for us to address is 
the welfare effects taking into account future investments, and the net effect of different 
regimes on future investment. This thesis will aim to discuss possible regulatory regimes in 
conjunction with existing regulation and market conditions in each region. Therefore, it is 
important to investigate whether the net neutrality is welfare maximising unambiguously, or 
whether the optimal regulatory regime can vary between countries and regions. 
 
1.5.2 Model selection 
The model I have selected is from Economides and Hermalin (2012) from the RAND Journal 
of Economics, titled “The economics of net neutrality”. There are multiple motivations for 
my model selection; 1) The model needs to be tractable in order to allow me to analyse the 
results. At the same time it needs to be concise enough that reasonable conclusions can be 
gleaned from it. 2) The model needs to address all aspects of the research questions posed in 
the introduction. More specifically, the model needs to address welfare effects of non-neutral 
strategies, like blocking and throttling, the welfare effects of prioritization, and the dynamic 
effects regimes have on investment and future welfare.  
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2  Model 
2.1 The Structure of the game 
This model involves 3 different agents: Content Providers (CP) who produce content for 
household consumption, Households (HH) that consume content from CPs, and a single 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) that intermediates the exchange by connecting the two. Figure 
1 shows the interactions between players in this model. 
 
 
The ISP servers have a total bandwidth capacity of B, which is the maximum content that can 
be transferred to households.  The ISP is a monopoly which divides the bandwidth across sub 
bandwidths, such that  𝐵!,𝐵!,……   𝐵! where n is the number of sub-bandwidths selected.  
 
Content providers are on a continuum [𝜃,𝜃) that has a distribution F(𝜃,𝜃) which 
approximates F(0,1). F’ >0 for all 𝜃 ∈ 𝜃,𝜃 . x(𝜃) is the units of content supplied by a given 
content provider (𝜃). Let 𝑄!   be a subset of CPs such that 𝑄 ⊂ 𝜃,𝜃  with dedicated 
bandwidth of 𝐵!. Given this, 𝑡 is the time required to send all content for all providers in the 
set such that  
 𝑡 𝑄! ≡ 𝑥 𝑄! 𝑑𝐹(𝑄!)! 𝐵!   (1) 
This shows that the total time required is the content for each CP in the set, integrated over its 
pdf and divided by the total bandwidth allocated to the set. 𝑥 𝑄!  is the demand for content in 
set 𝑄!.  𝑡 .  is a measure of congestion faced by content providers and 𝑡 𝑄  is the measure of 
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congestion for those in set Q. 𝜏(𝜃) will be used to denote the congestion faced by individual 
Content Providers, note that if 𝜃 ∈ 𝑄 then 𝜏 𝜃 = 𝑡(𝑄). 
 
There is also a continuum of consumer households (see figure 2 for a schematic 
representation). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HH utility is quasilinear and additively separable with respect to content from different 
providers. HH are also homogenous in preferences, with m’<0 and m’’<0. HH marginal 
utility is 
 𝑚 𝑥𝛼(𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃)  (2) 
 
for the xth unit of content from content provider 𝜃. 𝛼(𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃) is an adjustment factor, which 
accounts for the congestion in transmission, the value of that content to the households, and 
the households’ preferences regarding congestion for that content. We impose limitations on 
the convexity of the marginal utility, assuming that for any A, 𝐴𝑚!! 𝐴 +𝑚! 𝐴 < 0 in order 
to rule out infinite solutions in later calculations.  
 
Household utility function can now be expressed as 
 𝑈 = 𝑦 + 𝑚!(!)! 𝑥𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 𝑑𝑥!! 𝑑𝐹(𝜃) 
 
(3) 
where y is consumption from non internet goods and x(𝜃) is the consumption of the 𝜃th 
content provider’s good. We assume that 𝑦 > 0 so that the household never consumes its 
entire income on content and internet access. 
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We also impose the assumption that, all else held equal, households prefer less congestion 
and thus faster delivery to slower delivery. We also assume that higher 𝜃 content is more 
time sensitive to consumers. These are shown in conditions  
(4) and (5).   
 𝜏 > 𝜏!   → 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 <   𝛼 𝜏! 𝜃 ,𝜃   ∀𝜃 (4) 
 
 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 − 𝛼 𝜏! 𝜃 ,𝜃 < 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃! ,𝜃! − 𝛼 𝜏! 𝜃! ,𝜃!  
given 𝜏 > 𝜏!,𝜃 > 𝜃! (5) 
Due to the quasilinearity assumption and the unconstrained nature of the content 
consumption decision, I can manipulate equation (1) to derive the demand function. As 
marginal utility of the 𝜃th CP’s content will be equal to the price charged in equilibrium, the 
resulting demand is 
  𝑚 𝑥𝛼(𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃) = 𝑝⟷ 𝑥𝛼(𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃) = 𝑚!!(𝑝) 
 
(6a) 
 
 𝑥 𝑝,𝜃 =   𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 𝑚!! 𝑝 ≡ 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 𝜔(𝑝) 
 
(6b) 
where 𝜔(𝑝)= 𝑚!! 𝑝 , that is the inverse of the marginal utility. The equation above (6b) 
shows that demand for any given CP product at any given price will increase as 𝜏 decreases, 
which is reasonable, as it embodies the preference of consumers for faster content delivery. It 
also allows for demand to be differently affected for separate content providers. 𝜔(𝑝) does 
not vary across content providers and is an unvaried demand curve of sorts, where 
traditionally we would divide by the number of producers in the market, in this model this is 
encompassed by the 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃  function.  
 
When modelling the CP pricing decisions we need to define more variables. q is the 
advertising rate, c is the marginal cost of production and transmission of the content, and s is 
the gross payment to the ISP. As above x is the demand function for households and p is the 
price charged to households. CP profits are given by: 
 
 Π!" = 𝑚𝑎𝑥! 𝑝 + 𝑞 − 𝑐 𝑥 𝑝,𝜃 − 𝑠 (7) 
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Note that 𝑝 + 𝑞 − 𝑐 is the margin per unit of content exchanged. In order to rule out infinite 
consumption, we impose that lim!→!𝜔 𝑝 < ∞ and that 𝑝 ≥ 0 which both are reasonably 
realistic. In combination with the convexity assumption we imposed earlier, this is sufficient 
for a unique solution to exist.  By substituting (6) into (7) using demand we can show that 
 
 Π!" = 𝑚𝑎𝑥! 𝑝 + 𝑞 − 𝑐 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 𝜔(𝑝)− 𝑠 (8) 
As s is exogenous to the strategic pricing decision and 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃  is independent of price, the 
problem can be reduced to  
 𝜋 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥! 𝑝 + 𝑞 − 𝑐 𝜔(𝑝) (9a) 
Let 𝑝∗ define the optimal price of content, and 𝜋 is the gross profit factor. 
 𝜋 = 𝑝∗ + 𝑞 − 𝑐 𝜔(𝑝∗) (9b) Π!" = 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 𝜋 − 𝑠 
The consumer surplus is defined as the benefit to consumers when willingness to pay is 
higher than price.  𝑥 𝑝,𝜃 𝑑𝑝!!∗  (10) 
Using the same substitution we made at (9a), we can rewrite this as 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 𝜔 𝑝 𝑑𝑝!!∗ . (10a) 
I define the integral as 𝜎, which is the consumer surplus factor, and can thus define total 
welfare, W, as the sum of CP profit, consumer surplus and s, the transfer from CP to ISPs. 
The last is included as a direct transfer between members of society and does not entail a total 
welfare loss. Welfare from each individual CP is the amount of content sold, which yields 
both a profit and consumer surplus, this can be expressed as 𝜋 + 𝜎 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 . 
When summing across the entire set of content providers we find  
 𝑊 = (𝜋 + 𝜎)𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 𝑑𝐹(𝜃)!! . (11) 
This equation has some intuitive interpretations. All else held equal, welfare is increasing in 
the profit share per exchange of content providers, and the consumer surplus of households 
per exchange. This states that if the gains from trade increase, either via lower supply costs or 
higher valuation of the good provided, or both, then total welfare will increase, ceterus 
paribus. This equation also shows that all else held equal a lower range of content being 
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exchanged reduces welfare. It also shows that lower transmission times lead to higher 
welfare. However, content exchanged and transmission times are negatively linked, meaning 
that excluding content reduces congestion, the net effects of these two on welfare will be 
explored below. 
 
2.2 Welfare analysis 
This section of the model will focus on analysing the welfare under neutral and non-neutral 
regimes (a non-neutral regime allows for paid prioritization, but does not allow for blocking 
or throttling behaviour), in some cases looking at specific non-neutral regimes, while in 
others allowing players within the model to optimise themselves. The purpose of this section 
is to determine the regimes and conditions that optimise total welfare of the economy.  
 
2.2.1 Relationship between content traded and welfare 
In order to extend later analysis, determining the relationship between content and welfare 
will allow us to determine the welfare effects through the regimes’ effects on the amount of 
content traded. To that end, let 𝑄!,𝑄!…𝑄! denote subsets of [𝜃,𝜃) and as noted earlier, B is 
the total bandwidth of the network and can be subdivided and allocated in any way, with n 
CPs in the market, 𝐵!  ,𝐵!…   𝐵! subdivisions occur. In equilibrium we find that 
 𝑡! = 1𝐵! 𝑥 𝑝∗,𝜃 𝑑𝐹 𝜃!! . 
 
(12a) 
This equation states that 𝑡!, delivery time, is inversely related to the size of that specific CP’s 
bandwidth allocation 𝐵!, while increasing in the demand for content from content providers 
within set 𝑄!. Making the same substitution used to find equation (6), it can be shown as  
 1𝐵! 𝛼 𝜏! ,𝜃 𝜔(𝑝)𝑑𝐹 𝜃!! . 
 
(12b) 
As 𝜔(𝑝) does not vary across the integration, it can be pulled outside the integral. Taking 
into account that and the optimal pricing decisions of the CP’s found in section 2.1. 
 𝑡! = 1𝐵! 𝑥 𝑝∗,𝜃 𝑑𝐹 𝜃!! = 1𝐵! 𝜔(𝑝∗) 𝛼 𝑡! ,𝜃 𝑑𝐹 𝜃!!  
 
(12) 
I will start by comparing two different divisions of 𝜃,𝜃 . First 𝑄!,𝑄!,… ,𝑄!, and an 
alternative 𝑄!,𝑄!,… ,𝑄!, with divisions of B into 𝐵!  ,𝐵!,… ,𝐵! for the former, and 
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𝐵!  ,𝐵!,… ,𝐵! for the later. Rearranging equation (12) and aggregating across the bandwidth 
for each division leads to 
 𝐵!𝑡!!!!! = 𝑋,               𝐵!𝑡!!!!! = 𝑋.  (13) 
This is to say that the total amount of content sent in equilibrium is equal to the bandwidth 
allocations multiplied by delivery time and aggregated. Using equation (11) and rearranging 
it to be a summation of the partitions rather than an integration of the total range yield 
 𝑊 = (𝜋 + 𝜎)!!!! 𝛼 𝑡! ,𝜃 𝑑𝐹(𝜃)!!   (14a) 
We can rearrange equation (12) to find  𝐵!𝑡!𝜔(𝑝∗) = 𝛼 𝑡! ,𝜃 𝑑𝐹 𝜃!! . 
And by substituting this into (14a) and moving constant multipliers outside the summation 
we get  
 𝑊 = (𝜋 + 𝜎)𝜔(𝑝∗) 𝐵!𝑡!!!!! .  (14b) 
Using equation (13) we can insert total demand for the summation arriving at 
 𝑊 = (𝜋 + 𝜎)𝜔(𝑝∗) 𝑋.  (14) 
The same calculations can be made with 𝑄,𝐵  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡! to find the equivalent solution of 
 𝑊 = (𝜋 + 𝜎)𝜔(𝑝∗) 𝑋.  (15) 
Equations (14) and (15) can be used to show that when comparing the welfare of two 
different bandwidth partitions or two different states, total content demanded is a sufficient 
statistic to show higher total welfare. This can also be extended to state that any net neutral 
regime is welfare dominant to a non-neutral regime if the non-neutral regime leads to a 
reduction in total content exchanged. A key point that leads to this result is that households 
must have the same marginal utility across content from different sources. More content has 
two effects; it allows for more efficient allocations by households, as they are free to 
substitute consumption within a larger budget set, and it also has a constant positive effect on 
the profits of CPs.  
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2.2.2 Blocking’s effect on welfare 
Using the above result, I now focus on determining what effect blocking has on the total 
content exchanged, as that result can be extended to examine the effect that the ISP has on 
welfare when it chooses to block certain content. I start by partitioning the total range of 
content providers, into 𝑄!"#$%&'&   and  𝑄!"#$%&!&   where 𝑄!"#$%&!& ∪ 𝑄!"#$%&'& = 𝑄!"!#$. For 
blocking to be welfare enhancing, total volume of content exchanged must be larger with 
blocking compared to without blocking. Denoting these with 𝑋!"#$%&'(  and  𝑋!"#$%&' , with 
subscripts referring to blocking and neutral regimes respectively. 𝑋!"#$%&'( ≥ 𝑋!"#$%&' 
implies that blocking is weakly welfare superior while 𝑋!"#$%&'( ≤ 𝑋!"#$%&' implies that 
blocking reduces total welfare. Following this we use 𝑡!"#$%&'(  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡!"#$%&' to denote the 
transmission times under the two regimes. From the definition of t 𝑡!"!"#$%& = 𝑋!"#$%&'(𝐵  
and 𝑡!"#$%&' = 𝑋!"#$%&'𝐵 . 
Using proof by contradiction, assume that 𝑋!"#$%&'( ≥ 𝑋!"#$%&' . 
Given this, it is clear that 𝑡!"#$%&'( ≥ 𝑡!"#$%&' . 
Hence, given the negative effect of t on  𝛼 𝑡(𝜃),𝜃  𝛼 𝑡!"#$%&'(,𝜃 ≤ 𝛼 𝑡!"#$%&' ,𝜃 . 
Using (12) and (13) I find that  
 𝜔 𝑝∗ 𝛼 𝑡!"#$%&'(,𝜃 𝑑𝐹 𝜃!!"#$%&'& < 𝜔(𝑝∗)    𝛼 𝑡!"#$%&' ,𝜃 𝑑𝐹 𝜃!!"!#$  
However, this gives the conclusion that 𝑋!"#$%&'( < 𝑋!"#$%&' 
This is a proof by contradiction, as above it was assumed that blocking leads to higher 
amounts of content traded. Intuitively, this proof hinges on the fact that the 𝑄!"#$%&'&   is a 
subset of 𝑄!"!#$ and thus contains strictly less content. Transmission times necessarily 
increase with more content being traded, so in order for more content to be traded in 
equilibrium the transmission time must be higher than in the regime where less content is 
traded. Therefore, all that blocking achieves in practical terms is to lessen the households 
feasible set, as households now have strictly less content providers to smooth between. It also 
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lowers the total profits of the CP market by excluding positive profits for some content. So 
blocking lowers both the total profits of CPs and the consumer surplus of HH, 
unambiguously reducing total welfare.  
 
This and the earlier results are sufficient to conclude that blocking is welfare reducing, as it 
lowers total content exchanged. It is important to this result to note that I have implicitly 
assumed that the blocking regime does not prioritize traffic, and that all data within the 𝑄!"#$%&!" subset is treated equally. This is to isolate the effect of blocking from that of 
prioritization of data.  
 
It is also worth noting that this result for blocking implies that throttling must also be welfare 
harming, as throttling leads to higher transmission times and does not entail a transmission 
time reduction for other content. Thus, this can only serve to reduce consumption of those 
contents that are throttled and causes consumers to reoptimise to other content, which by 
definition must reduce welfare6. 
 
2.2.3 The welfare effects of prioritization 
In order to examine the welfare effects of prioritization, the net effect of the preference 
function on different types of content providers must be determined. This is because in order 
to tease apart whether total welfare is increasing or increasing with reallocations of 
bandwidth to different content providers, the cross-partial derivative with respect to 
transmission time and content type must be examined. Intuitively, because the preference 
function depends on both the type of content, and the transmission time for a given content, 
the relationship between the two determines how different regimes affect welfare. To 
examine this, first the bandwidth constraint must be calculated. The bandwidth used by any 
given content provider 𝜃 is the total demand for 𝜃 content divided by the transmission time 
for that content7. Therefore the bandwidth used by 𝜃 content is 𝑥 𝜃𝜏 𝜃 𝑑𝐹 𝜃  (15a) 
Aggregating this over the entire range of content gives us the total bandwidth constraint 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 If degrading transmission times on specific content has no effect on consumer surplus and total welfare, then 
said content must have not been consumed at all in the previous equilibrium. 
7 As there is a continuous range of content and content providers, it is simpler to consider each content provider 
as providing a specific content, although it is not necessary or required. 
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𝐵 = 𝑥 𝜃𝜏 𝜃!! 𝑑𝐹 𝜃  (15) 
Using equation (6), substituting out demand, and rearranging leads to 𝐵 = 𝜔 𝑝∗ 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃𝜏 𝜃!! 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 . (16) 
I will now use a Lagrangian solution to the constrained optimization of welfare subject to the 
bandwidth constraint. Starting with equation (11) 𝑊 = (𝜋 + 𝜎)𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 𝑑𝐹(𝜃)!!  (11) 
and the constraint 𝐵 = 𝜔 𝑝∗ 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃𝜏 𝜃!! 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 . (16) 
In Lagrange form the problem of maximizing welfare becomes  ℒ = (𝜋 + 𝜎)𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 𝑑𝐹(𝜃)!! −   𝜆 𝜔 𝑝∗ 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃𝜏 𝜃!! 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 − 𝐵 , (17) 
where 𝜆 is the multiplier on the constraint. Simplifying this expression we arrive at ℒ = 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 (𝜋 + 𝜎!! −   𝜆(𝜔 𝑝∗𝜏 𝜃 )𝑑𝐹(𝜃). 
Maximizing this function for each 𝜃 with respect to 𝜏 𝜃 , is akin to maximizing  𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 𝜋 + 𝜎 −   𝜆(𝜔 𝑝∗𝜏 𝜃 . 
The second term is positive (Economides & Hermalin, 2012). Given this, and that 
maximization solutions do not vary across log transformations, 𝜏 𝜃  must also maximize  log 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 +log(𝜋 + 𝜎 −   𝜆(𝜔 𝑝∗𝜏 𝜃 ) (18) 
We assume an interior solution exists. How the optimal 𝜏 𝜃  varies across 𝜃 depends on the 
cross-partial derivative of (16) with respect to 𝜃 and 𝜏 𝜃 . If it is positive, then optimal 𝜏 𝜃   is increasing in 𝜃. If it is negative, then optimal 𝜏 𝜃   is decreasing in 𝜃. If it is constant 
then there will be a single optimal 𝜏 𝜃  for all 𝜃.  
 
The sign of this equation will be the sign of the term log 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃  as the second term 
must be positive. The cross partial derivative of log 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃  is linked to the elasticity of 
demand with respect to transmission time. Using the general formula   
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𝜀 𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑑 log 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑 log 𝑥  
to determine the elasticity of demand w.r.t transmission times using the general formula and 
equation (6) we can find 𝜀 𝜏,𝜃 ≡ −𝒹 log 𝛼 𝜏,𝜃 𝜔 𝑝∗𝒹 log 𝜏  (19) 
Note that log 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃  appears in the numerator of this equation. Therefore the sign of the 
cross partial derivative and the sign of (19) will be the same. We can remove the strictly 
positive function 𝜔 𝑝∗  as it will not affect the sign of the elasticity8.  −𝒹 log 𝛼 𝜏,𝜃𝒹 log 𝜏 = −𝜏𝒹 log 𝛼 𝜏,𝜃𝒹(τ)  (20) 
If we take the derivative of this final term with respect to 𝜃 then this will have the same sign 
as the cross partial derivative of log 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 . More formally 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑑! log 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃𝑑𝜏𝑑𝜃 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛   𝑑𝜀 𝜏,𝜃𝑑𝜃  (21) 
This shows that whether and how much content should be prioritized depends on how elastic 
demand is with respect to transmission times, and how that varies across different contents.  
 
Economides & Hermalin (2012) show in their Proposition 3 that, if we assume 𝑑𝜀 𝜏,𝜃 /𝑑𝜃 
is monotone, then higher 𝜃 being more elastic, 𝜀 𝜏,𝜃 > 𝜀 𝜏,𝜃′ , implies that welfare 
maximizing distributions entail shorter transmission times 𝜏(𝜃!) > 𝜏(𝜃). This suggests an 
optimal non-neutral allocation. However, if 𝑑𝜀 𝜏,𝜃𝑑𝜃 = 0 
then the welfare maximizing solution is the net neutral allocation. These results are intuitive 
if we remember that total content traded is a sufficient statistic for welfare.  
 
A key conclusion to remember here is that the result hinges on the elasticity of different 
content with respect to delivery time. This means that, given 𝜃 > 𝜃!, if 𝜃 content is more 
elastic than 𝜃! content and thus faces a larger change in demand when transmission times 
change.  Then under a neutral regime they would have the same transmission times, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8Note an error in Economides & Hermalin (2012), which equates the right hand side of (19) with the left hand 
side of (20) which is only true in sign. 	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shifting bandwidth from 𝜃! content to 𝜃 content, thus changing the transmission times, would 
increase demand for 𝜃 more than it decreases demand for 𝜃′ thus increasing total content 
traded and thus increasing welfare. Thus net neutrality is not welfare optimal. In contrast no 
such welfare increase is possible in the latter case, thus net neutrality is welfare optimal. 
 
It is important to note that earlier assumptions require that higher 𝜃 content is more sensitive 
to transmission times than lower 𝜃 content by definition. This can be expressed as 𝒹!𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃𝑑𝜃𝑑𝜏 < 0. 
This does not imply anything about the sign of equation (21). This is a crucial distinction 
because it is possible to have solutions where prioritizing lower 𝜃 content over higher 𝜃 
content is the welfare maximising solution. This possibility goes against intuition, but is 
possible due to households being able to reoptimise their consumption decisions9.  
 
A special case of this result can be shown if it is assumed that the preference function can be 
decomposed into two different functions, that is if the preference function is multiplicatively 
separable  𝛼 𝑡,𝜃 = 𝛾 𝜏 𝑣 𝜃 . (22) 
With some additional assumptions on those functions10, this decomposition directly implies 𝑑𝜀 𝜏,𝜃𝑑𝜃 = 0. 
Thus, due to the result we found earlier, if preference function is separable and 𝑔 𝑡  is 
convex, then a net neutral regime is strictly welfare superior to any non-neutral regime that 
excludes a non-zero amount of content. It is also strictly welfare superior to any regime 
where different transmission times for different content providers arise. A net neutral regime 
is now weakly welfare superior to any non-neutral regime (Economides & Hermalin, 2012).  
 
2.2.4 Internet service provider’s pricing decisions and welfare effects  
The previous section addressed the efficient allocations possible with a centralised solution, 
but did not address whether the ISP would choose to price in this manner when 
unconstrained, this will be addressed in this section.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Economides and Hermalin (2012) page 612 for an explanation and a more comprehensive example 10	  𝛾 𝜏 > 0, 𝑣 𝜃 > 0,	  𝛾! 𝜏 < 0, 𝑣! ! > 0,𝑔 𝑡 = !! ! ,𝑔 𝑡 > 0,𝑔! 𝑡 > 0,𝑔!! 𝑡 > 0	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This is a two sided pricing model, which means that the ISP is able to both charge households 
for their access to the internet, while also charging CPs an access fee to transfer their content. 
In a neutral regime, the price charged to CPs by the ISP is constrained to zero and thus the 
only strategic decision left to the ISP is the price of the connection fee for households, 
denoted 𝜂. In a non-neutral regime, the ISP is free to select the profit maximising 
combination of both fees. In earlier results, it was shown that excluding a range of content 
providers via blocking was welfare harming. This leads to our next result for the ISP pricing 
decisions. Suppose ISP charges content providers an access fee, with a single tier of service, 
denoting this access fee s. If 𝑠 > 0 and the equilibrium results in any content providers not 
providing content due to the fee, then the equilibrium is welfare inferior to a regime where 𝑠 = 0. This is because the latter regime increases total content traded, which is a sufficient 
statistic for welfare. This result is not obvious, as although there is no marginal cost of supply 
to the ISP, there is a marginal external cost via congestion and higher transmission times. The 
result hinges on the ability of households to internalize congestion into their optimization 
decision, and thus reducing their opportunity set can never be welfare increasing.  
 
It was earlier shown that blocking is welfare harming, and it was shown that pricing with a 
single positive price is also welfare harming. The next step is to investigate the welfare 
effects of prioritization in the context of both feasible optimal pricing and tiering decisions, 
and furthermore, whether these optimal prices will be selected by the ISP in a non-neutral 
regime. 
 
A reasonable assumption is that, as the individual transmission time for any given content 
goes to infinity, the preference function, 𝛼 𝑡! ,𝜃  approaches zero. This is rational in practical 
terms, as extreme transmission times can completely degrade the value of the content. 
Formally this assumption is shown as  lim!→!𝛼 𝜏,𝜃 = 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝜃  ∀   𝜃,𝜃  (23) 
Suppose there are two services, where a prime denotes the higher tier of service: transmission 
times 𝜏! < 𝜏, and corresponding prices 𝑠! > 𝑠. If the lower content type 𝜃′ maximises profit 
by selecting higher tier prioritization, then 𝑝∗ + 𝑞 − 𝑐 𝜔 𝑝∗ 𝛼 𝜏′,𝜃! − 𝑠! ≥ 𝑝∗ + 𝑞 − 𝑐 𝜔 𝑝∗ 𝛼 𝜏,𝜃! − 𝑠,   
(24) 
which is the same as  
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𝜋 𝐶𝑃 𝛼 𝜏!,𝜃! − 𝑠! ≥ 𝜋 𝐶𝑃 𝛼 𝜏,𝜃! − 𝑠, (25) 
From equation (4), we know that 𝛼 𝜏′,𝜃! >   𝛼 𝜏,𝜃! . It follows that  𝜋 𝐶𝑃 𝛼 𝜏!,𝜃! − 𝛼 𝜏,𝜃! ≥ 𝑠! − 𝑠. 
Substituting equation (5) into the parenthesis, and taking into account the strict inequality in 
equation (4), we can rearrange the result to find that equation (25) implies the following: 
 𝜋 𝐶𝑃 𝛼 𝜏!,𝜃 − 𝑠! > 𝜋 𝐶𝑃 𝛼 𝜏,𝜃 − 𝑠. (26) 
This result shows that, if any lower 𝜃 content chooses higher tiered service, then all content 
providers with higher 𝜃 strictly prefer this service also. Thus if any content providers decide 
to exit the market due to 𝑠 > 0, then it will be the lowest 𝜃 content providers who exit first. 
This result is intuitive in that, if a content provider who is less sensitive to transmission time 
prefers a lower transmission time, coupled with a higher access fee price, then content which 
is more sensitive to transmission times must also prefer the lower transmission time and 
higher access fee. Furthermore, the higher 𝜃 content must have a greater utility gain from the 
higher tier service relative to the lower service. This result also conveniently rules out 
discontinuous or mixed strategies for CPs. This, in combination with the relationship between 
demand elasticity and the cross partial derivative of transmission and content providers found 
earlier, allows us to make statements about the welfare effects of prioritization.  
 
Economides and Hermalin (2012) show in their proposition 5 that, if   𝑑𝜀 𝜏,𝜃𝑑𝜃 ≤ 0, (27a) 
then no non-neutral regime with price discrimination provides higher welfare than the neutral 
regime, i.e. net neutrality is welfare superior. However, if    𝑑𝜀 𝜏,𝜃𝑑𝜃 > 0, (27b) 
then there is a welfare maximizing non-neutral regime which is welfare superior to net 
neutrality. This result does not state that the market will reach a welfare superior result if 
(27b) is true; it only provides that such a solution exists. Typically ISP profit maximization 
and welfare maximization do not perfectly align. It is difficult to say whether pricing 
decisions of ISPs will generally harm or help welfare in the latter case without further 
analysis. It also needs to be examined whether ISPs will choose a positive price if not 
constrained, as otherwise the regime choice is somewhat irrelevant. The key result here is 
that always using a neutrality regime cannot be welfare improving relative to optimal policy 
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decisions.  
 
In determining the ISP’s pricing decisions, the ISP’s profit function must be derived. The 
ISP’s pricing decisions for both CPs, via s, and for household connection fees, via 𝜂, need to 
be considered, where 𝜂 is the connection fee charged to households for connection to the 
internet: 𝜂 = 𝜎𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 𝑑𝐹(𝜃)!!  (28a) 
The ISP will capture the entire consumer surplus given homogenous households11. This result 
occurs regardless of which regime is chosen. This can also be shown as a share of total 
equilibrium welfare, 𝜂 = 𝜎(𝜋 + 𝜎)𝑊. (28) 
Here the ISP partially internalizes welfare into its profit function, which leads to the next 
result. If ISP pricing scheme is not welfare maximizing, then enforcing a neutral regime will 
lead to an increase in 𝜂 as 𝑊 increases. This does not affect households’ welfare in this 
model because the ISP captures their entire surplus regardless of the price they face in 
equilibrium12.  
 
We now turn to the maximization of the ISP’s profit. Given the bandwidth constraint in (16), 
ISP profit is a function of both the connection fee for households, and the connection fee for 
CPs. If we allow for continuous price discrimination across content providers and assume 
that 𝜏 𝜃  is a non increasing function, then it can be shown that this can lead to ‘too much’ 
price discrimination from a welfare perspective (Economides & Hermalin, 2012) 13.  
 
However these results do not reflect realistic circumstances where currently proposals 
involve a finite number of tiers. Suppose instead that the ISP is limited to offering two tiers 
of prioritization. I will use h and l subscripts to denote high and low tiers respectively. This 
implies that 𝜏! < 𝜏!, with respective prices 𝑠!  and  𝑠!. Content providers have the choice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Even with heterogeneous households, the ISP can still perfectly price discriminate. Economides & Hermalin 
(2012) show that the results here do no hinge on homogenous households. 
12 Economides & Hermalin note this as a possible factor in political economics surrounding this issue, but this is 
not a focus of this thesis. 
13 Note that this does not use the multiplicatively separable assumption.	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between the higher priority tier, the lower priority tier, and not purchasing either. Formally, 
their profits when selecting each of the tiers are given by: Π!"(0) = 0,   Π!" l = 𝜋𝛼 𝜏! ,𝜃 − 𝑠! , Π!" h = 𝜋𝛼 𝜏! ,𝜃 − 𝑠! . 
Given that 𝜃 > 𝜃′, let the subscripts l, h and 0 be the pair of 𝑡! and 𝑠!, either high, low or 
zero. Assume 𝑟  denote a higher service than 𝑟′. If the 𝜃 type prefers a lower service to a 
higher one, that is ℎ ≺ 𝑙,  ℎ ≺ 0 or 𝑙 ≺ 0, then the 𝜃′ type content providers must also follow 
these preferences.  Equivalently, if the 𝜃′ type content producers prefer a higher service type 
to a lower one, ℎ ≻ 𝑙,  ℎ ≻ 0 or 𝑙 ≻ 0, then the 𝜃 type content providers must also hold the 
same preferences. Thus, the only time we have discrimination is when the 𝜃 type content 
providers select a higher tier of prioritization than the 𝜃′ type content providers. 
 
Given the continuum of content providers there must exist two cut-off points that separate the 
content providers into ranges that select respective services. We can denote these cut-off 
values as 𝜃! and 𝜃!, where 𝜃 < 𝜃! < 𝜃! < 𝜃. All 𝜃 > 𝜃! will choose the high priority 
service, all 𝜃 < 𝜃! will choose no service, or in other words will not enter the market. While 𝜃! < 𝜃 < 𝜃! will choose the low priority service. Content providers on cut-off values are 
indifferent.	  	  
The ISP will price 𝑠! so that the cutoff 𝜃! content provider will have its profits fully extracted. 
If 𝑠! didn’t fully extract this, then the ISP could increase profits by increasing 𝑠! without 
affecting demand. Also, if 𝑠! is higher than the cut-off content provider’s surplus, then the 𝜃! 
content provider will not enter the market, and thus reducing 𝑠! will increase demand more 
than it harms profit per content provider. Therefore, allowing the cut-off content provider’s 
surplus to be fully extracted, we arrive at 𝑠! = 𝛼 𝑡! ,𝜃! 𝜋.	   (29) 
Solving for 𝑠! is more complicated as the cutoff value is indifferent between earning the 
same positive profit from selecting 𝑠! or 𝑠!. In this sense, the ISP is unable to fully capture 
the profits, and this mimics the traditional adverse selection issue.  𝛼 𝑡! ,𝜃! 𝜋 − 𝑠! = 𝛼 𝑡! ,𝜃! 𝜋 − 𝑠! 	  
Rearranging and using equation (29) to substitute 𝑠!, this leads to  𝑠! = 𝛼 𝑡! ,𝜃! 𝜋 − 𝛼 𝑡! ,𝜃! 𝜋 + 𝑠! 	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𝑠! = 𝜋 𝛼 𝑡! ,𝜃! − 𝛼 𝑡! ,𝜃! + 𝛼(𝑡! ,𝜃!) 	  
The profit function for ISPs in this setup can be written as  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐼𝑆𝑃 = 1− 𝐹 𝜃! 𝑠! +    1− 𝐹 𝜃! (𝑠! − 𝑠!)+ 𝜂	  
 
(30) 
In order to further define this profit function, the multiplicatively separable preference 
function assumed earlier in (22) is required. Furthermore, for simplicity it is useful to define 
the integral of the decomposed preference function for content as 
𝐼 𝜃!,𝜃! = 𝑣 𝜃 𝑑𝐹 𝜃!!!! ,	  	  
 
(31) 
while also making a notational simplification in the form of 	   𝐺 𝑧 = 𝑔!! 𝑧 .	   (32) 
The appendix provides a comprehensive transformation from (30) to (33), which uses 
equations (22), (31), (32) and (28a) to find  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐼𝑆𝑃 = 1− 𝐹 𝜃! 𝜋𝑣 𝜃! 𝑦 𝐺 𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃!𝐵!+    1− 𝐹 𝜃! 𝜋𝑣 𝜃! 𝑦 𝐺 𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃𝐵!− 𝜋𝑣 𝜃! 𝑦 𝐺 𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃!𝐵! )
+ 𝐵!𝐺(𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃!𝐵! )𝜔(𝑝∗) + 𝐵!𝐺(𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃𝐵! )𝜔(𝑝∗)  
(33) 
	  
If a net neutrality regime were in place, and the access fee charged was the price required to 
not exclude any content, this would be the price that extracts the entirety of the lowest 
content provider’s surplus. Formally the optimal pricing scheme given these restrictions is	  𝑠 = 𝜋𝛼(𝑡∗,𝜃).	  	  Define	  𝜃	  that solves	  𝐼 𝜃,𝜃 = 𝐼 𝜃,𝜃 	  or equivalently	   𝑣 𝜃 𝑑𝐹 𝜃!! =𝑣 𝜃 𝑑𝐹 𝜃!! .	  Given no exclusion and a neutral regime, it is equivalent to the following 
tiering system,	  𝐵! = 𝐵! = 𝐵/2,	  𝑠! = 𝑠! = 𝑣(𝜃)𝑦(𝑡∗),	  	  𝜃! = 𝜃,	  𝜃! = 𝜃.	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Given the above adjustment function being separable as described in equation (22), ISPs will 
strictly prefer non-neutral regimes and a non-neutral solution if unconstrained (proof can be 
found in Economides & Hermalin (2012)). This is intuitive, as with only one ISP in this 
model, allowing non-neutrality expands its strategic set and thus cannot harm its profits. This 
result wouldn’t necessarily apply in models with more than one ISP in direct competition 
with each other. But in this setting a non-neutral regime allows the ISP to price discriminate 
and extract additional surplus from the content providers, in addition to the surplus they fully 
extract from the households. 
 
The next result relies on a number of assumptions: firstly, that 𝛼(𝑡,𝜃) is multiplicatively 
separable. Secondly, that the function 𝑔 𝑡 = 𝑡/𝛾 𝑡  is convex, and finally, that the ISP uses 
imperfect (or limited) price discrimination against content providers. With these assumptions 
in place, the paid prioritization (or non net neutral) regime that maximises the ISP’s profits 
does not maximise welfare. This result is intuitive, as earlier it was shown that excluding 
content providers is welfare harming. In this case non-neutral pricing involves strictly 
positive prices for each tier, which can exclude content providers from the market when it 
drives their profits below zero, which occurs when 𝜃! > 𝜃. This pricing allocation must 
necessarily decrease the total content exchanged and thus decrease total welfare14.  
 
However, if we allow for perfect price discrimination by the ISP, then the ISP will select the 
welfare maximizing tiering allocation. This is intuitive as when the ISP price discriminates 
perfectly to both the household and the contents providers, the ISP extracts the entire surplus 
of both, and thus, as the ISP’s total profit is the total welfare of the model, maximizing 
welfare maximizes the ISP’s profit. In perfect price discrimination, no content providers that 
would otherwise provide content are excluded and thus welfare is not harmed in the same 
manner as the imperfect case.  
	  
2.2.5 Dynamic effects on welfare 
The dynamic effects of the different regimes can be shown in this model via an endogenous 
B. Up until this point, the results have all assumed an exogenously given B that does not 
depend on any of the respective players’ surpluses or the total welfare of the network. This 
analysis is essentially a static view of the economy, as in the short term bandwidth is fixed. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Note that this is analogous to the argument proposed to show that blocking is welfare harming.	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However, in a dynamic setting bandwidth is a function of investment and can be increased or 
decreased over time. This section will analyse the investment decisions of the ISP with 
respect to different regimes. We assume a marginal cost of bandwidth of 𝑘 > 0. For 
simplicity we assume 𝑘! = 0, i.e. 𝑘 is constant. Moreover, we let 𝛼 𝜏,𝜃 = 𝜃/𝜏 and 𝐹  is  uniform  on   0,1 . This special case satisfies condition (22). With continuous 
discrimination instead of discrete discrimination across content providers, the ISP profit 
function can be given by: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐼𝑆𝑃 = 𝜂 + 𝜋𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 − 𝜋 1− 𝐹(𝜃)𝑓(𝜃) 𝛿𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃𝛿𝜃 𝑑𝐹(𝜃)𝑑𝜃!!  (34) 
Note that this is the continuous equivalent to (33) with continuous pricing options. Modifying 
this equation with the new assumptions and with the bandwidth investment decision now 
embedded into the equation we can show that the problem can be stated as  
max!(!) 𝜎 + 2𝜋 − 𝑘𝜔 𝑝∗𝜏 𝜃 𝜃 − 𝜋!! 1𝜏(𝜃)𝑑𝜃 
(35) 
The solution to this equation is 𝜏 𝜃 = ∞, 𝑖𝑓  𝜃 ≤ 𝜋𝜎 + 2𝜋 𝜏 𝜃 = 2𝑘𝜃𝜔(𝑝∗)2𝜋 + 𝜎 𝜃 − 𝜋 , 𝑖𝑓  𝜃 > 𝜋𝜎 + 2𝜋 
From this solution we can define the level of bandwidth the unconstrained ISP would select. 
Starting with equation (16) and substituting the range of 𝜃 into it we find 𝐵!"!  !"#$%&' = 𝜔 𝑝∗ 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃𝜏 𝜃!! 𝑑𝐹 𝜃  (36) = 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 2𝜋 + 𝜎 𝜃 − 𝜋2𝑘𝜃!!!!!! 𝑑𝐹 𝜃   
Then substituting the explicit form of the preference it can be shown that 𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 = 𝜃𝜏 = ( 2𝜋 + 𝜎 𝜃 − 𝜋)𝜃2𝑘𝜃𝜔(𝑝∗)  
𝐵!"!  !"#$%&' = 2𝜋 + 𝜎 𝜃 − 𝜋 !4𝑘!𝜃𝜔(𝑝∗)!!!!!! 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 = 𝜎! − 𝜋! + 2𝜋! log
2𝜋 + 𝜎𝜋8𝑘!𝜔(𝑝∗)  (37) 
Through equivalent calculations for the neutral regime it can be shown that 𝐵!"#$%&' = 𝜎!8𝑘!𝜔(𝑝∗) (38) 
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as the neutral regime is essentially setting 𝜋 = 0. In order to determine which regime leads to 
higher investment we need to determine the sign of −𝜋! + 2𝜋! log 2𝜋 + 𝜎𝜋 = −𝜋!( 1− 2 log 2+ 𝜎𝜋 ) 
where a negative sign indicates that a neutral regime leads to higher bandwidth and a positive 
sign indicating that a non-neutral regime leads to higher bandwidth, as 𝜋  and  𝜎 are strictly 
positive, if the interior of the bracket is negative then the equation is positive. As 
 2 log 2 > 1 
then the equation is positive for any values of 𝜋  and  𝜎, and therefore a non-neutral regime 
leads to higher total bandwidth in equilibrium. This result is expected, as the ability to 
discriminate to some extent internalizes the total welfare, as we found in previous results. 
Internalizing welfare means that the ISP now has a larger incentive to invest, as the 
externalities that CPs and households experience from this additional investment now directly 
result in greater profits to the ISP. Now we turn towards the welfare effects taking into 
account an endogenous bandwidth supply, using equation (11) and (16). Accounting for the 
marginal cost of supply, it can be shown that 𝑊 = (𝜋 + 𝜎 − 𝑘𝜔(𝑝∗)𝜏(𝜃) )𝛼 𝜏 𝜃 ,𝜃 𝑑𝐹(𝜃)!!  (39) 
which yields different solutions for the neutral and non-neutral regimes,  𝑊!"#$%&' = 2𝜋𝜎 + 𝜎!8𝑘!𝜔(𝑝∗) (40) 
 
𝑊!"!  !"#$%&' = 𝜋 + 𝜎 4𝜋! + 3𝜋𝜎 + 𝜎! − 𝜋! 4𝜋 + 2𝜎 log  (2𝜋 + 𝜎𝜋 )8𝑘!𝜔(𝑝∗)(2𝜋 + 𝜎)  (41) 
 𝑊!"#$%&' ≶𝑊!"!  !"#$%&' 
 
This is due to the relative values of welfare in each regime being dependent on the values of 𝜋  and  𝜎. Once ISP investment decisions are introduced, net neutrality regimes may still be 
welfare optimal, but no longer must be. Letting 𝜎 = 𝜋ℎ, we have that 𝑊!"#$%&' <𝑊!"!  !"#$%&' if and only if 4+ 3ℎ − 2 2+ ℎ log 2+ ℎ ≥ 0 
where h satisfies this equation in equality if ℎ ≈ 1.314 
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Economides & Hermalin (2012) state in their proposition 9 that given all assumptions made 
in this result, the ISP will always invest more in bandwidth in the non-neutral regime, and 
this will lead to a higher welfare if ℎ < 1.314. However, if ℎ > 1.314 then the neutral 
regime is still welfare superior, even with lower total bandwidth supply. This result is 
striking, as it shows the difference in optimal policy between static and dynamic settings. It 
also shows that allowing price discrimination and tiering always leads to higher bandwidth 
supply, which is akin to higher investment in infrastructure. This is due to the fact that, in this 
model, the ISP can extract some of the surplus of the CP, thus leading it to internalize the 
increase in content traded from a higher supply of bandwidth.  
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3 Discussion  
In this section, I will begin with a discussion of the implications of the results, as well as 
limitations, future areas of interest and comparisons with other areas of the literature on net 
neutrality. I will continue on to contrast and make connections with other regulatory 
decisions and expand on the answers to the research questions that were addressed with the 
model.  
 
3.1 Implications and summary of results 
3.1.1 Results  
Total content traded is a sufficient statistic for welfare 
This result means that using total content traded as a ranking measure perfectly preserves the 
welfare ranking and magnitude between different regimes. This greatly simplifies 
calculations and directly implies many of the following results. It is also somewhat intuitive, 
as the surplus from trade that exists between the CPs and households can never be negative in 
a marginal sense. Any content that is traded must at worst have a net surplus of zero, because 
any price that leads to the household having a negative surplus, i.e. the value of the good is 
less than the price, would not result in exchange. Equivalently, any price of content that is 
below the marginal cost of providing the content will not be produced by CPs. Therefore, 
only cases where the surplus of either party is at worst zero must occur in exchange. This 
implies that higher exchange of content from consumers to content providers must increase 
total welfare. The preference function does offer an interesting complication in that there is a 
social marginal cost of congestion, but this is internalised to some degree by households and 
as a result, does not alter the above intuition. 
 
Blocking is welfare harming 
The above result implies that blocking has a negative effect on welfare. This result can be 
extended to throttling. This has policy implications, because ensuring that blocking and 
throttling behaviour are eliminated entirely improves overall welfare, regardless of the 
frequency in which these acts occur. Blocking and throttling being welfare harming should 
not be an unexpected consequence, as both concepts entail a deliberate degradation of the 
quality of service to the household, either in the form of reduced range of content to select 
from in terms of blocking, or increased transmission times lowering the value of the content 
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artificially in the case of throttling. In contrast to efficient rent extraction which infer a direct 
transfer from one party to another with no loss to the system, these practices degrade the 
value of certain content within the network with no trade-off of increased value elsewhere. 
 
The welfare effect of prioritization depends on 𝒅𝜺(𝝉,𝜽)/𝒅𝜽 
The welfare effect of prioritization depends on whether the elasticity with respect to 
transmission time varies across content providers. If it does, then the optimal allocation can 
be non-neutral, and thus removing net neutrality can be welfare improving. However, if the 
partial derivative is equal to zero, then the net neutral regime is welfare optimal and thus 
removing it can only be welfare harming. Following on from this, if the preference function 
is multiplicatively separable and is concave in transmission time, then net neutrality is strictly 
welfare superior to any non-neutral regime which excludes any amount of content, or 
imposes different transmission times in equilibrium. If demand for content is equally 
sensitive to transmission time across different content providers, then keeping all content 
transmission times equal is the most effective way to maximise demand. This is because it 
allows consumers to spread their consumption most effectively across the range of content 
providers, by allowing them to take a more efficient bundle of content, without any 
distortions to the first best allocation due to varied transmission times. This is an optimal 
allocation for households as a result of the diminishing marginal utility of any given content 
it consumes. Given the option, households strictly prefer a varied content portfolio to 
consume, rather than one containing multiple units of the same type of content.  
 
The ISP strictly prefers non-neutral regimes 
Provided that the preference function is multiplicatively separable, the ISP will strictly prefer 
non-neutral regimes and will implement a positive price for content providers to enter the 
network. This is a reasonable result as with a single ISP the ability to set positive prices CPs 
yields an additional revenue stream with no. As a monopolist, the ISP must always weakly 
prefer non-neutral regimes as they can still choose to charge a price of zero to CPs if that 
maximises profit. In other words allowing the ISP more strategic choices can never harm its 
profit. With the above assumptions the ISP now strictly prefers non-neutral regimes and 
would choose to implement a price of greater than zero for CPs. It is interesting to note that 
any price that does not force any content providers to exit the market is essentially just a 
transfer from the CPs to the ISP and has no total welfare effect. 
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The welfare optimal regime depends on the degree of price discrimination with fixed 
bandwidth supply 
With imperfect price discrimination, assuming a multiplicatively separable preference 
function, the allocation selected by the ISP is not welfare optimal. However, if perfect price 
discrimination is used, then the ISP selects welfare optimal prices and tiers, and a non-neutral 
regime is welfare optimal. In the former case, the ISP only extracts part of the surplus from 
the CPs, so it only partially internalises the welfare losses from setting prices in a way that 
lowers total content exchanged. The ISP then faces a trade-off between maximising the 
amount of surplus that can be extracted from CPs, and the number of content providers that 
can be induced to stay in the market. The profit maximising result will entail some exit from 
the market and thus will be welfare harming, therefore a neutral regime would be preferable 
from a welfare perspective. In contrast, with perfect price discrimination the ISP completely 
expropriates the surplus of the content providers. Therefore, given the ISP already claims the 
entire consumer surplus, the ISP’s profit is the same as total welfare, and incentives align 
perfectly. Therefore, the non-neutral regime is welfare optimal with perfect price 
discrimination. 
 
Net neutrality negatively affects investment by the ISP 
It is clear that a neutral regime negatively affects profits of the ISP. The reduction in profits 
directly leads to a reduction in investment for ISPs. This reduces the total bandwidth of the 
network. The reduction in profits occurs in all future periods, so it dramatically reduces the 
net present value of the ISPs. Furthermore, not only does it affect the value of the industry, 
which is directly tied to its ability to raise capital, but it also reduces the value of the future 
investment. As the ISP is unable to extract any of the additional profits the CPs receive from 
a higher bandwidth supply, the ISP can only extract the additional surplus enjoyed by the 
HH. Without being able to extract some rent from CPs, the ISP does not internalise enough of 
the positive externalities of a more powerful network, and thus selects a socially insufficient 
level of investment. Although in this model the ISP invests in a higher bandwidth capacity, 
this can be generalised to maintenance, existing infrastructure upgrades, and building next 
generation networks. This result is particularly important due to the positive externality 
investment in infrastructure has on all end users of the internet in the real world, and this will 
be addressed later.  
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The effect on welfare in a dynamic setting from net neutrality is ambiguous 
Again assuming perfect price discrimination and a multiplicatively separable preference 
function, the welfare superior regime depends crucially on the values of 𝜋 and 𝜎, the profit 
share of the CPs, and the consumer surplus from that sale respectively. In order for there to 
be welfare indifference between net neutrality and a non-neutral policy, it must be the case 
that 𝜎 ≈ 𝜋1.314. So if the consumer surplus per unit of content is larger than this 
indifference point, or 𝜎 > 𝜋1.314 then allowing paid prioritization is welfare optimal. 
However, if the consumer surplus is below this indifference point, or 𝜎 < 𝜋1.314, then net 
neutrality would be the welfare optimal solution. Therefore in order for a non-neutral regime 
to be weakly welfare superior to the neutral regime, the following relationship must hold: 1.314 𝑝∗ + 𝑞 − 𝑐 𝜔 𝑝∗ ≤ 𝜔 𝑝 𝑑𝑝!!∗  
This equation allows us to discuss market conditions that are more likely to lead to non-
neutral regimes being optimal. The profit share is defined by the margin the CP receives on 
each unit of content traded 𝑝∗ + 𝑞 − 𝑐, where c is the marginal cost of producing content, q is 
the advertising rate and 𝑝∗ is the optimal price to households to purchase content. Lower 
profit shares are more likely to lead to non-neutral regimes being optimal, which is intuitive 
as lower profit shares imply a certain degree of competition, or sufficiently sensitive demand. 
As the ISP fully extracts the CPs’ profit in this model, this matches the results many studies 
find, that strong competition between ISPs can minimize the requirement for, or even replace 
net neutrality laws (Wallsten & Hausladen, 2009; Wang et al., 2014). Lowering the optimal 
price 𝑝∗ increases the right hand side of this equation, the consumer surplus, by lowering the 
lower bound of the integration. Intuitively, it is increasing the consumer surplus for all 
consumers who already purchase the content by a linear amount. It also increases the number 
of consumers that purchase the content as 𝜔 𝑝  is decreasing in 𝑝∗, which is expected of a 
downward sloping demand function. The effect of decreasing 𝑝∗ on the left hand side of the 
equation is more ambiguous as the number of consumers purchasing the content increases, 
yet the margin on each piece of content sold decreases. When the price is at the optimal level, 𝑝∗  an increase or decrease in price will reduce the total profit of the CPs (and by extension 
the ISP) by definition. It can also be inferred that higher advertising revenues decrease the 
likelihood that a non-neutral regime is welfare optimal, and the same conclusion can be 
reached for lower marginal costs. This is an especially important result as it implies that there 
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can be different policy solutions for different countries, depending on the amount of market 
power or competitiveness in the content provider market.	  
 
3.1.2 Realism of the model’s assumptions 
ISP monopoly 
Is it reasonable to model the ISP as a monopolist, despite all of the major economic areas we 
have focused on (the US, Europe and Norway) having some degree of competition? In some 
regards ISPs intrinsically hold a monopoly over a certain market segment, as they are the 
only connection to households subscribed to their servers (Krämer et al., 2013). However, 
even some degree of competition can partially mitigate this market power and with HH being 
able to switch ISPs easily, this drastically reduces the market power of ISPs. 
 
If modelling with ISP competition embedded into the model is considered, it could 
potentially have some effects on the results and mechanisms. As with some degree of 
competition between ISPs, the consumer surplus may no longer be entirely expropriated, 
because competition would mitigate the ability to perfectly price discriminate.  
 
It is also no longer clear that ISPs will prefer a larger array of pricing choices, as restraining 
the decisions of all ISPs collectively could lead to higher profits for ISPs individually. Net 
neutrality regulations that prevent all ISPs from setting positive prices for CPs could improve  
the ISPs’ profits in some cases.. This is because charging the CPs can hurt the total content 
exchanged and reduce the surplus that HH receive, and ISPs extract. Thus, ISPs might prefer 
that all ISPs are constrained by net neutrality. This is despite charging CPs being a dominant 
strategy, in the same way that removing the ability to defect in the traditional prisoners 
dilemma game can improve all players’ outcomes15. In the case of multiple ISPs, strategic 
decisions and effects can lead to dynamic inefficiencies (Bourreau, Kourandi, & Valletti, 
2015). These can likely be avoided in real life by coordination, both within the industry and 
by the regulator. 
 
Multiplicatively separable preference function  
A multiplicatively separable preference function was a prerequisite for determining the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The traditional prisoners dilemma game involves 2 players, who can choose to cooperate or defect. Both 
players have the dominant strategy to defect, but would both be strictly better off if both were constrained to 
cooperate only. In that sense the equilibrium of the game is not welfare maximizing if constraint is possible. 
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decisions of the ISP’s pricing strategies in a static setting, as well as determining the welfare 
effects of prioritization in both the static and dynamic settings. As such, it is appropriate to 
address whether this is a reasonable assumption to make. This assumption is known as a 
regularity assumption. It imposes some restrictions while making comparison and 
calculations tractable, although it does reduce the game space in some sense, as it excludes 
possible preference functions. In practical terms, it is a very reasonable assumption that does 
not influence the applicability and validity of the results. 
 
Constant marginal investment costs  
In terms of simplicity and tractability of the model, applying constant marginal costs for 
investment is certainly justified. In the long term, as no costs are truly fixed or sunk in larger 
timeframes, constant marginal costs seems to be a reasonable approximation of real life 
generally. What it does fail to capture in this model is the minimum required investment in 
order to build a next generation network. A better representation of real life conditions would 
have a minimum level of required investment in order to build the next generation network. 
Depending on calibration and the thresholds assigned, this could have a varied effect. This 
critique seems to be supported by the fact that Verizon and other ISPs have opted to 
indefinitely delay or halt fibre optic infrastructure rollouts indefinitely, rather than scaling 
back the degree of investment incrementally.  
 
Alternatively, when comparing the selection of constant marginal costs with potentially 
increasing or decreasing marginal costs, the model selection is well justified. Choosing to use 
non-constant marginal costs implies allowing for economies or diseconomies of scale, or 
escalating or deescalating input costs, and there is no reason to incorporate these into the 
marginal cost curve. This is because real world equivalent investments often entail 
deployment to more geographic areas rather than an additional upgrade on top of prior 
investment, in this sense keeping marginal costs of investment and, implicitly, the marginal 
product of investment constant, seems very reasonable.  
 
Is total welfare or consumer surplus a better measurement of societal gain? 
Many competition watchdogs use consumer surplus as a measure of welfare when 
considering mergers or other activities that may decrease competition (Pittman, 2007; Tirole, 
1988). This is motivated by the implication that any merger that is attempted must be 
privately profitable, thus when agencies know the companies are increasing profit, their 
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primary concern becomes the consumer (Whinston, 2007). This raises the question of 
whether consumer surplus should also be used in net neutrality debates to determine optimal 
policy. This is because consumer surplus and total welfare do not necessarily correlate 
positively or strongly, and the welfare maximising outcome does not necessarily maximise 
the consumer surplus16. It can be argued that the ideal regulatory regime should be 
determined by consumer surplus rather than total welfare. This is because the profit 
maximising outputs of corporations do not benefit households. An opposing argument is that 
total welfare can be considered a more accurate view of the benefits to society. This is 
because total welfare essentially takes into account all of the gains from trade, rather than 
those only occurring on the consumer end of the transaction. Increasing a corporation’s profit 
whilst leaving consumers unaffected is valuable to society, especially when you consider that 
the shareholders of companies are usually the consumers, either through private holdings or 
public stakes, which are funded by their taxes. In Economides and Hermalin (2012), the 
consumer surplus is always zero, which is a product of the pricing schemes allowed and will 
be discussed below. 
 
Perfect v imperfect price discrimination 
The result of the static welfare optimisation decision between tiering and no tiering depends 
crucially on what degree of price discrimination is allowed within the model. Perfect 
discrimination allows the ISP to extract the entire market rent from the CPs. Which means 
the ISP obtains all of the welfare gains for the economy in the form of profits, as the ISP 
already extracts the entire consumer surplus. Because of this, the ISP’s wealth maximisation 
and public welfare maximisation perfectly align. However this assumption is unrealistic for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, perfect price discrimination means to make all CPs indifferent 
between entry and no entry, thus charging a unique price to each CP based on their exact 
profit function. This requires the rather unreasonable real world assumption of perfect 
information. Secondly, it also relies on no uncertainty existing in the model and a very simple 
cost curve for content providers. In reality, the ISP working as a monopoly would be able to 
extract some of the surplus from CPs, but not the entire amount. It would thus be more 
realistic to model this with a finite number of tiers as a restriction constraining the ISP. This 
restriction directly implies imperfect price discrimination. Other models within the literature 
have yielded similar outcomes, finding that the results are dependent on the amount of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In Economides & Hermalin (2012) the HH always had their surplus fully extracted in all equilibriums and so 
were indifferent, which is an unrealistic but useful simplification. 
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discrimination allowed. Some have used perfect discrimination and found non-neutral 
regimes to be welfare maximising (Coucheney, Maillé, & Tuffin, 2012; Wang et al., 2014). 
Baranes (2014) used a two tier system and found an ambiguous results. This is encouraging, 
as it provides some evidence that an imperfect discrimination extension of Economides and 
Hermalin’s (2012) dynamic setting might also lead to an ambiguous result. 
 
This is also an issue with the household consumption, as allowing perfect price 
discrimination against households (which is assumed in all parts of this model) coupled with 
the ISP monopoly means that consumer surplus is always zero. It also removes the potential 
trade off between lowering access fees for consumers and raising fees for CPs in order to 
improve ISP profits, as the ISP always captures the entire CP, in any case. Allowing HHs to 
not only retain surplus, but also allowing a non trivial decision about choosing to consume 
any internet access at all, seems like a reasonable possible extension or alternative viewpoint 
worth exploring. Sidak (2006) explores this direction, with non-perfect price discrimination 
for HHs, and as a result finds that not all households purchase the connection to the internet 
in equilibrium. He frames the issue as a trade off between innovation and investment within 
the content market, and investment in core infrastructure of the network. Sidak (2006) 
concludes in favour of paid prioritization because it leads to lower broadband access fees, and 
thus more consumers. There is a reasonable argument as to whether internet accessibility for 
households is limited by geographical installation and rollouts of networks, or whether a 
meaningful segment of the market is priced out.  
 
3.1.3 How the results compare with other models 
This model is an extension of an earlier paper written by Choi and Kim (2010), who found 
that paid prioritization decreases investment incentives for the ISP, directly contradicting the 
results of this model. They also find that paid prioritization weakens CP investment 
incentives, which, if we assume that investment incentives decreases with a decrease in 
profitability, is consistent with the results of Economides and Hermalin (2012). There are a 
large number of two sided pricing models that will be discussed here, some of which contrast 
the results of this thesis, while others support it.  
 
Baranes (2014) focuses on modeling geographic spread of investment by having two 
segments of internet access, some with access to low speed only, and others with access to 
	  42	  
both low and high speed. He finds the welfare effects to be ambiguous, and under certain 
conditions he also finds that a non-neutral regime could increase investment and lead to 
welfare gains, both of which are consistent with the results of Economides and Hermalin 
(2012). Musacchio, Schwartz, and Walrand (2009) find an ambiguous welfare result when 
comparing the neutral and non-neutral regimes. They find that the likelihood in which the 
neutral regime is welfare superior is increasing the more competitive the ISP industry 
becomes. This last result is interesting, as it contradicts the theories that competition can be a 
substitute for net neutrality regulation (Kotrous, 2015). When considering two different types 
of content providers, small and large respectively, Courcoubetis, Sdrolias, and Weber (2014) 
find that paid prioritization increases CP profits when they derive most of their income direct 
fees, however, the result becomes ambiguous when CPs primary income is advertising 
revenue. This result indicates that a net neutral regime might actually harm CP profits under 
certain conditions. Positions on the effect of paid prioritization on CP investment have also 
been mixed, some finding investment increases, causing total welfare to also increase 
(Bourreau et al., 2015), whereas Gans (2014) finds that not only does it have a large negative 
effect on CP investment, but the effect on the investment of ISPs is negligible. There have 
been results which suggest that paid prioritization is unambiguously welfare superior, either 
due to erosion of ISP profits and thus investment lowering, or because the rent extraction 
from perfect price discrimination allows for the efficient allocation to be realized (Coucheney 
et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2014). However, others reach the opposite conclusion (Choi & Kim, 
2010). 
 
3.1.4 Future possible extensions 
A growing population, endogenously increasing congestion over time 
There is a wealth of empirical evidence suggesting that the levels of internet consumption 
will continue to grow steadily, with internet access becoming increasingly accessible in 
developing countries and many services in developed countries being shifted online 
(European Commission, 2014b; International Telecommunications Union, 2014; Statistics 
Norway, 2014). As both the number of users consuming internet and the average 
consumption per consumer is rising, it seems reasonable to build these two factors into the 
model in order to give a more representative picture of what the real world trends are. 
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Minimum investment requirement to increase the network capacity 
This would be an interesting area of investigation, as it would more accurately reflect the 
investment decisions ISPs are faced with when determining different investment routes. 
Building next generation networks requires completion in order to bear any return, whereas 
upgrading existing networks can bear a marginal return, but is less efficient and will 
ultimately become insufficient. However, this direction of research would likely suffer from 
the need to calibrate the model in order to yield results. The size of the minimum investment 
relative to the profit function of the ISP would be crucial, as it would result in a binary 
investment decision, so the shift from no investment to investment and vice versa would 
likely be the determinant of optimal policy.  
 
Multiple ISPs 
As discussed above, there are very reasonable elements of the network structure that lead to 
ISPs having monopolistic power over some segment of the market. However, contrasting the 
general results with an extension involving competition between ISPs would introduce 
strategic effects that could alter results and lead to interesting conclusions. As discussed 
earlier, adding more competition is known to have a detrimental effect on ISP profitability 
and therefore investment (Baranes, 2014; Kotrous, 2015; Wallsten & Hausladen, 2009). This 
seems the most reasonable element to add into the existing model. A duopoly setting was 
addressed by Economides in a different model and was found to yield similar results 
(Economides & Tåg, 2012). Yet other models find that competition leads to the opposite 
conclusion (Coucheney et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2014). Interestingly, some also find that the 
introduction of competition makes the ISPs indifferent between regulatory regimes 
(Boussion, Maillé, & Tuffin, 2012). 
 
Dynamic model with imperfect price discrimination 
One of the largest criticisms of this model is that, while both perfect and imperfect price 
discrimination from the ISP to the CPs is considered in the static setting, only perfect price 
discrimination is considered with endogenous bandwidth supply. A very reasonable and 
direct extension of this model would involve exploring this case, although it is possible this 
would yield ambiguous results, owing to the ambiguous result the perfect price 
discrimination gave. 
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More emphasis on dynamic issues 
The dynamic effects of net neutrality are in many respects the most crucial. Regulatory 
agents are tasked with maximising welfare of the population over an infinite horizon. In this 
sense the regulator has an obligation to future generations and must take future effects into 
consideration when making decisions in the present. Models should place emphasis on this 
long-term effect of net neutrality, as there is a large body of research on static outcomes 
already in place (Coucheney et al., 2012; Courcoubetis et al., 2014; Economides & Tåg, 
2012; Wang et al., 2014), while existing models focusing on dynamic issues have given 
conflicting results (Baranes, 2014; Bourreau et al., 2015; Gans, 2014; Sidak, 2006). 
 
3.2 Regulatory decisions and their effects 
3.2.1 Prevalence of throttling and blocking 
Both blocking and throttling have been shown to clearly decrease welfare. They are both also 
extremely anti-competitive practices that negate market participants’ ability to compete on a 
fair and reasonable level. All content providers and regulators and a vast majority of ISPs 
state publicly that they are against throttling and blocking. Given the damaging result both for 
the industry and for welfare from these behaviours, prevention of these tactics should be a 
strategic factor for regulators to consider. Prevalence of these behaviours has been 
surprisingly common in both the US and the EU (BEREC, 2012; Ehrenfreund, 2014). In 
contrast, there have been no documented cases of throttling or blocking in Norway, This 
speaks to the success of the coregulatory approach discussed earlier. Norwegian oligopolies 
generally, and ISPs specifically, are extremely compliant and have active discourse and input 
when discussing these issues with NKOM and CCN. The prevalence of these anticompetitive 
behaviours should to some degree argue for more regulatory oversight to prevent it from 
continuing. For the Norwegian case, this implies that the coregulatory approach actually 
leads to requiring less regulatory oversight. 
 
3.2.2 Investment and net neutrality regulation 
Net neutrality has an unambiguously negative effect on ISP investment. In situations where 
net neutrality is welfare optimal, it is likely that this is a second best solution, with ISP 
investment being below socially efficient levels. Given the constant marginal costs and the 
network efficiency effects, it seem reasonable to assume that welfare is increasing over the 
relevant range of investment levels, ceterus paribus. Since investment is therefore socially 
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sub optimal, it is useful to consider possible solutions in order to boost or prevent a reduction 
in ISP investment. One possible solution was offered by Economides (2008), who presents an 
argument in favour of net neutrality, while also finding a negative effect on ISP investment 
and suggests subsidisation as a possible solution to this issue. His position was motivated by 
the efficiency and welfare gains the infrastructure provides, due to network effects. If the ISP 
is unable to internalise enough of the positive externalities from CPs, then a possible solution 
is to subsidise the network investments. An alternative approach would be to reduce barriers 
to entry in the ISP market by lowering municipal regulation and requirements, which Kotrous 
(2015) offers as a viable alternative to net neutrality regulation. However, even if it is 
determined that net neutrality is optimal, the additional entry resulting from lower municipal 
requirements is still valuable if it leads to a relative boost in ISP investment. This issue is one 
that I feel is often overlooked or dismissed and is one of the key tensions within this debate.  
 
3.2.3 Compulsory unbundling regulation 
Effects in conjunction with net neutrality 
Compulsory unbundling has an unambiguously negative effect on investment in next 
generation models (Wallsten & Hausladen, 2009). It also has a positive effect on the number 
of entrants and the amount of competition within the ISP industry, specifically within 
networks (Wallsten & Hausladen, 2009). Given this, it has been considered as a potential 
solution to net neutrality, although research suggests that it would be ineffective (Wallsten & 
Hausladen, 2009). The presence of compulsory unbundling could change the optimal policy 
for a given country, as compulsory unbundling has the same effect as strong net neutrality 
regulation, in terms of reducing ISP profit. Therefore, it also reduces investment incentives, 
both by lowering future profitability, and regulating that any company can rent parts of the 
next generation network from the incumbent. This regulation leads to a reduction not only of 
the profit from future investment, but also by completely removing the competitive advantage 
such a development would normally yield. Furthermore, it also introduces the possibility of 
renting bandwidth at a regulated low price from any competitor who chooses to build one. 
The strategic decision observed to occur most frequently is that all competitors opt to not 
invest in new networks (Wallsten & Hausladen, 2009). 
 
Different regulation within each country 
 Compulsory unbundling has previously occurred in the US, but is not being considered as a 
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regulatory measure for next generation models, largely owing to the relative failure to boost 
investment, as predicted. In contrast, compulsory unbundling was considered successful in 
both the UK and Norway (Crandall et al., 2013; NKOM, 2015; OECD, 2003; Wallsten & 
Hausladen, 2009).  In both countries compulsory unbundling is applied to any monopolistic 
network to ensure sufficient competition (European Commission, 2010; NKOM, 2015). This 
has been stated to include the next generation internet access networks, or the fibre optics 
network referred to earlier (European Commission, 2010; NKOM, 2015). Research shows the 
similar effects this policy has on investment, competition, and potentially welfare, 
underlining the importance of considering these policies and effects in combination with a 
neutrality policy decision (Crandall et al., 2013; Nardotto et al., 2014; Wallsten & Hausladen, 
2009). It follows that differing compulsory unbundling policies could lead to different net 
neutrality policy decisions between countries. 
 
3.3 Potential differences in optimal policy between 
countries 
Given the following three results: 1) the welfare maximising regime depends on the 
consumer surplus and profit share per content exchanged, 2) the investment in the next 
generation networks will be negatively affected by the neutral regime, 3) the degree of 
cooperation and related regulations vary between countries. It is reasonable to conclude that 
the ideal policy to implement may well vary between countries.  
 
3.3.1 Europe 
Since the optimal policy can vary between countries, it raises the question of whether the EU 
ruling to impose net neutrality will have a positive or negative effect on the welfare of 
consumers within those markets. Given the prevalence of blocking behaviour found in 
Europe (BEREC, 2012), it is reasonable to assume that the legislation will at least partially 
mitigate this phenomenon. The total welfare effect of the EC implementing net neutrality 
regulation will depend on both the sign and magnitude of the welfare shift caused by 
imposing neutrality in each individual country. More specifically, the total effect would 
depend on how many countries’ optimal policies would involve non-neutral solutions, and 
how damaging the suboptimal non-neutral solutions would be for the others. This raises the 
familiar tension of Europe wide policies, as there is a diverse range of countries and markets 
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collectively regulated by the EC. Thus, what is optimal for some countries will almost 
certainly introduce inefficiencies in others. However, the contrasting issue is that many 
companies compete and operate business across multiple countries and regions, and thus 
enforcing universal rules reduces the level of regulatory arbitrage possible. Furthermore, it 
enforces a clear and level playing field for both ISPs and CPs across Europe. Further research 
should be conducted to determine the relative welfare implications of suboptimal levels of 
regulation. More specifically, one should compare the cost of incorrectly implementing net 
neutrality in countries that do not require it, with the cost of failing to implement net 
neutrality policy in countries that require it. Determining these costs, along with the 
likelihood of each country within the EU preferring net neutrality, will allow for more 
concrete conclusions regarding the ideal policy decisions for the EC. 
 
3.3.2 U.S.A 
The US has a different political and regulatory setting compared to the EU and Norway. 
Companies are very litigious and the legalities of any legislation or regulation are decided in 
the courts (Kushnick, 2014). An earlier ruling has led to the FCC reclassifying the broadband 
access market under ‘Title II’ and this is sure to be challenged in the courts (Kushnick, 2014; 
Mashables, 2015). Given the existence of throttling and blocking behaviour, it implies that all 
else held equal, regulatory oversight should be stricter in order to prevent this welfare 
harming behaviour from occurring (Ehrenfreund, 2014). These behaviours are welfare 
harming, and while not directly considered in the welfare equations, the first result of 
Economides and Hermalin (2012) shows that these practices damage welfare prevention 
would yield a welfare improvement. The US also has no compulsory unbundling in place, so 
the investment incentives are not lowered as much as in other countries. Which means the 
reduction in investment incentives for ISPs are not exasperated by unbundling policy leads to 
a lower reduction from regulation overall. Due to these factors, with other market conditions 
held equal, the US is more likely to favour a stronger net neutrality regime. 
 
3.3.3 Norway 
Norway has a unique regulatory approach, as there is a substantial amount of cooperation and 
collaboration between the regulator, ISPs and CPs. Norway has no documented cases of 
throttling or blocking and the industry has historically been extremely compliant with 
regulators’ decisions. Norway is also one of the only countries in the world to have 
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successfully implemented compulsory unbundling and is planning on applying the same 
policy to the next generation network of fibre optics. This policy will have a negative effect 
on investments in next generation networks, which will compound the effect on investment if 
net neutrality is implemented. While some major ISPs, such as Telenor, object to NKOM’s 
position on net neutrality, they still comply with their directives. As such, the optimal policy 
regarding net neutrality in Norway will depend on the consumer surplus, and the profitability 
of content providers. Total welfare is certainly aided by the lack of anticompetitive practices, 
and optimal regulation may or may not allow for paid prioritization.  
 
3.3.4 Optimal policy comparisons 
As discussed in the above sections, the optimal policy for each country depends crucially on 
the profits of the ISP per content exchanged, relative to the consumer surplus of the 
exchange. This warrants empirical investigation to determine the relative values in each 
individual market, in order to make more concrete recommendations. What can be said is that 
both the consumer surplus, and the profit shares will be heavily dependent on the degree of 
competition within each market. Ideally, further analysis would consist of not only empirical 
studies determining these two crucial variables, but also determining the relative welfare 
losses and prevalence of anti competitive behaviour in each country, along with the 
associated costs of regulating the industry. However analysis of this degree of specificity is 
not only beyond the scope of this thesis, but also overly specified given the assumptions and 
limitations of this model and this field of literature discussed in section 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, 
respectively. 
 
 The conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis must be tempered with the above 
caveats, but will still show interesting insights. It is worth noting that although I have focused 
on incorporating compulsory unbundling into the discussion of the net neutrality policy 
decision, it is possible that other regulations or policies have additional effects that warrant 
examination. If I for a moment assume that the consumer surplus and profit margin, per unit 
of content, are equal across the US, EU and Norway, it allows for interesting conclusions as a 
result of key factors noted in each of these markets. The US has blocking and throttling 
behaviour occurring and has no compulsory unbundling policy in place for the fibre optic 
next generation network. Europe has observed blocking and throttling occurring, and the 
European Commission has put in place compulsory unbundling legislation and directives to 
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its members. Norway, in contrast, has not observed blocking or throttling, and has 
compulsory unbundling policies in place and intend to implement them on the next 
generation networks. This leads to the conclusion that under this assumption, the US is the 
most likely to have net neutrality as its optimal policy, while the EU is less likely and 
Norway is the least likely. 
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4 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has focused on the issue of net neutrality. Initially I defined the issue and framed 
its political and practical consequences for Norway, Europe and the US. These countries have 
important differences, with Europe and the US both having cases of throttling and blocking. 
In the US, telecommunications companies have an extremely litigious history. The original 
net neutrality doctrine was overturned in the legal system, allowing blocking and throttling to 
occur, and the major telecommunication companies promise that the most recent legislation 
will be similarly challenged. The European Commission takes a very pro neutrality position 
and has passed legislation allowing reasonable network management, but forbidding both 
blocking and throttling. In contrast, Norway uses a coregulatory approach and has issued 
directives that preclude blocking and throttling. There are no documented cases of it 
occurring within their networks.  
 
The results of Economides and Hermalin’s model show that blocking and throttling are 
welfare harming. They also find that paid prioritization welfare effects with fixed bandwidth 
depend on whether the elasticity of demand changes across content providers. In a dynamic 
setting, they also find that ISP investment is harmed by net neutrality. When accounting for 
ISP investment with perfect price discrimination, the welfare results are ambiguous and 
depend on the profit share per unit of content, relative to the consumer surplus per unit of 
content. Thus, whether net neutrality is welfare optimal depends on the relative values for 
each country. This opens the possibility that net neutrality may be optimal in some countries 
but not others. Different regulatory approaches, including prevalence of blocking and 
throttling and whether compulsory unbundling exists, are relevant for determining which 
countries are more likely to have optimal net neutral policies.  
 
Future research should be focused on dynamic effects and the role investment has to play 
while incorporating competition within the ISP industry, the effects of existing regulations 
(compulsory unbundling in Norway and the UK, for example), the minimum investment 
required for next generation networks, as well as imperfect price discrimination for both the 
CPs and the HHs. If consumer surplus and profit shares are held constant, it is more likely 
that the US maximises welfare with strong net neutrality while it is less likely that the same is 
true in Norway. 
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Appendix 
Explicit calculations with separable preference function 
 
This is a more formal calculation of the result from section 2.2.3, I will start by extending the 
assumptions about the preference function, returning to equation (12) 
𝑡! = 1𝐵! 𝜔(𝑝∗) 𝛼 𝑡!,𝜃 𝑑𝐹 𝜃!"  (12) 
Suppose that the preference function is multiplicatively separable and can be decomposed as 
below  𝛼 𝑡,𝜃 = 𝛾 𝜏 𝑣 𝜃 , (22) 
 also assume both  𝛾 𝜏   and  𝑣(𝜃) are strictly positive and 𝛾 𝜏  is a decreasing function 
whereas 𝑣 𝜃  is an increasing function. Both are measurable and continuous functions. 
Define a function 𝑔 𝑡 , which contains 𝛾 𝜏  and thus derives its properties from it. Assume  𝑔 𝑡  is convex, however this assumption does not constitute a large departure from the 
embedded assumptions, given the composition of 𝑔 𝑡  it will be convex over large portions 
of its range, if not its entire range. All of these are formally shown below: 𝛾 𝜏 > 0, 𝑣 𝜃 > 0 (A1) 
 𝛾! 𝜏 < 0, 𝑣′ 𝜃 > 0 (A2) 
 𝑔 𝑡 = 𝑡𝛾 𝜏 ,𝑔 𝑡 > 0,𝑔! 𝑡 > 0 (A3) 
 𝑔!! 𝑡 > 0  ,𝑔!!" 𝑡 > 0   (A4) 
 𝑔!! 𝑡 > 0 (A5) 
To begin solving for the optimal transmission times, first substitute (22) into (8). 
𝑡! = 1𝐵! 𝜔(𝑝∗) 𝛾 𝜏 𝑣(𝜃)𝑑𝐹 𝜃!"  
 
(A6) 
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As 𝛾 𝜏  does not vary across the subset it can be extracted from the integral.  𝑡!𝛾 𝜏 = 1𝐵! 𝜔(𝑝∗) 𝑣(𝜃)𝑑𝐹 𝜃!"  (A7) 
Substituting in 𝑔 𝑡  on the left hand side and inverting the equation leads to 
𝑡! = 𝑔!! 𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐵! 𝑣(𝜃)𝑑𝐹 𝜃!"  (A8) 
In the case of a net neutral regime the equilibrium time is  
𝑡∗ = 𝑔!! 𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐵 𝑣(𝜃)𝑑𝐹 𝜃!!  
(A9) 
As B is now evenly distributed between all content, and no content is tiered or excluded. This 
leads to the next result.  
 
Economides & Hermalin (2012) state in their Proposition 4 states that if equation (22) is an 
appropriate separation of the preference function, and if 𝑔 𝑡  is a convex function, then a net 
neutral regime is strictly welfare superior to any non-neutral regime that excludes a non-zero 
amount of content. It is also strictly welfare superior to any regime where different 
transmission times for different content providers arise. A net neutral regime is weakly 
welfare superior to any non-neutral regime. 𝑊!"#$%&' ≥𝑊!"!  !"#$%&' 
 𝑊!"#$%&' 𝑄!, 𝑡∗ >𝑊!"!  !"#$%&'(𝑄!, 𝑡) 
 if 𝑄! > 𝑄! or if 𝑡∗ ≠ t for any group of content providers.  
 
It is worth noting that proposition 4 follows directly from proposition 3, as equation (22) 
implicitly states that  𝑑𝜀 𝜏,𝜃𝑑𝜃 = 0 
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Deriving the profit function of the ISP 
Calculations from section 2.2.1 
 
The profit function for ISPs in this setup can be written as  	   𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐼𝑆𝑃 = 1− 𝐹 𝜃! 𝑠! +    1− 𝐹 𝜃! (𝑠! − 𝑠!)+ 𝜂	  
 
(30) 
In order to determine the effects of neutral and non-neutral pricing, 𝑠! , 𝑠!  and  𝜂 must be 
solved in order to determine a more explicit profit function. Using the earlier assumption 
from equation (22) about separability of the preference function and assuming they are both 
differentiable. The following notations are useful for simplifying the equations 	   𝐼 𝜃!,𝜃! = 𝑣 𝜃 𝑑𝐹 𝜃!!!!  
(31) 
	   𝐺 𝑧 = 𝑔!!(𝑧)	   (32) 
To begin solving for s!, start with equation (12)  𝑡! = 𝜔(𝑝∗) 𝑣 𝜃 𝑦(𝑡)𝑑𝐹 𝜃!!!"  
Substitution of (31) and (32) leads to 	   𝑡! = 𝐺 𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃!𝐵! , 
 
(A10) 
using equation (29) and substituting into (A10) it follows that 	   𝑠! = 𝜋𝑣 𝜃! 𝑦 𝐺 𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃!𝐵! ,	  
 
(A11) 
making an equivalent calculation for the high type gives an equivalent expression  	   𝑠! = 𝜋𝑣 𝜃! 𝑦 𝐺 𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃𝐵! . 
 
(A12) 
Now to solve for 𝜂, which is done using (28a)  	   𝜂 = 𝜎𝑦 𝑡 𝑣 𝜃 𝑑𝐹 𝜃!!!! + 𝑣 𝜃 𝑑𝐹(𝜃)!!! , 
 
(A13) 
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substituting using equations (31) and (22c) leads to the intermediate equation below 	   𝜂 = 𝜎 𝑡!𝑔(𝑡) 𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃! + 𝑡!𝑔(𝑡) 𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃 . 
 
(A14) 
Substituting in equation (33) 	  
𝜂 = 𝜎 𝐺(𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃!𝐵! )𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃!𝑔(𝑡) + 𝐺(𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃𝐵! )𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃𝑔(𝑡) , 	  
(A15) 
and finally substituting in equation (22c) and rearranging.  	  
𝜂 = 𝜎 𝐵!𝐺(𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃!𝐵! )𝜔(𝑝∗) + 𝐵!𝐺(𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃𝐵! )𝜔(𝑝∗)  
 
(A16) 
An explicit ISP profit function can now be shown by taking equation (30) and substituting in 
equations (34), (35) and (36) respectively to find   𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐼𝑆𝑃 = 1− 𝐹 𝜃! 𝜋𝑣 𝜃! 𝑦 𝐺 𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃!𝐵!+    1− 𝐹 𝜃! 𝜋𝑣 𝜃! 𝑦 𝐺 𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃𝐵!− 𝜋𝑣 𝜃! 𝑦 𝐺 𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃!𝐵! )
+ 𝐵!𝐺(𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃!𝐵! )𝜔(𝑝∗) + 𝐵!𝐺(𝜔(𝑝∗)𝐼 𝜃! ,𝜃𝐵! )𝜔(𝑝∗) 	  
 
(33) 
 
 
 
